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SHAREHOLDER ACCESS TO THE
PROXY REVISITED
Jayne W. Barnard*
We have an interesting situation in which large institutions are re-
jecting the old Wall Street rule because their holdings are [now]
large enough that it makes economic sense for them to spend time
and money protecting the governance power associated with their
shareholdings.... In the future, you'll... see pension funds be-
coming even more aggressive in perhaps nominating their own can-
didates for boards of directors and asking more pointed, specific
questions about the operation of the corporation.'
One of the goals underlying the enactment of the Securities Exchange Act
of 19342 was to reduce management's domination of corporate boards of
directors. In enacting Section 14 of the Exchange Act,3 Congress hoped to
ensure shareholders an informed and constructive role in the selection and
oversight of corporate directors.4 The Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion's (SEC or Commission) application and enforcement of Section 14 has
only partially achieved that result. Investors now receive comprehensive in-
* B.S. University of Illinois; J.D. University of Chicago; Associate Professor of Law,
Marshall-Wythe School of Law, The College of William & Mary. I am especially grateful for
the assistance of Melvin Eisenberg, Mortimer Caplin, Kurt Wulff, Virginia Rosenbaum of the
Investor Responsibility Research Center, Jamie Heard of Analysis Group Inc., Richard H.
Koppes and Kayla Gillan of the California Public Employees Retirement System, and Nell
Minow of Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. In addition, I acknowledge the contribu-
tions of the faculty members at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law who participated in a
work-in-progress workshop in September 1989, especially Alemante Selassie. Scott Finkel-
stein, William & Mary '90, and Stephanie Stakem and Charles Phillips '92, provided research
support for this project.
I. Economic Reasoning Changing Direction of SEC Deliberations. Grundfest States, 22
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 209 (Feb. 9, 1990) (quoting former SEC Commissioner
Joseph Grundfest).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78KK (1988).
•3. Id. § 78n.
4. See infra note 51 and accompanying text; see also SEC v. Transamerica, Inc., 163 F.2d
511, 518 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948) ("It was the intent of Congress to
require fair opportunity for the operation of corporate suffrage. The control of great corpora-
tions by a very few persons was the abuse at which Congress struck in enacting Section
14(a).").
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formation on board candidates and their backgrounds.5 They are not, how-
ever, significantly involved in matters of corporate governance.
There are sound economic and behavioral reasons why many shareholders
do not take an active role in the selection and oversight of top management.
6
But, contrary to the assertions of those who disparage "corporate democ-
racy" as a fanciful and largely empty notion,7 some shareholders do actively
seek to participate in governance matters and have relevant expertise to
bring to the process. Ironically, accumulated actions of the SEC have ex-
cluded these shareholders from playing an effective governance role. Not
only has the SEC limited the means by which shareholders may initiate dia-
logue on governance matters, it also has failed to support shareholders seek-
ing to participate in the selection of their own fiduciaries.8
Shareholders in large publicly held companies, while nominally empow-
ered under state law to elect the directors who will represent their interests,9
are systematically deprived of two significant opportunities: they are neither
permitted to play a meaningful role in the selection of directoral candidates,
nor to choose among competitive candidates for scarce board positions.
A typical proxy ballot will list, for example, ten "official" candidates for
ten board seats. Generally, either the incumbent board or a nominating
committee comprised primarily of outside directors selects the nominees.
Those nominees who are suggested by shareholders--even substantial and
well-informed shareholders-but who are not favored by incumbent man-
agement do not appear on the ballot, 10 nor does management provide any
opportunity to choose among its "approved" candidates.
On rare occasions, shareholders are provided a choice among directoral
candidates. During the infrequent proxy fight, " an insurgent faction may
organize its own slate of candidates and present the names of these candi-
dates for shareholder consideration in documents separate from those pre-
5. See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 259-62 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 29, 234 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 13-15, 213-29 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(3) (1983).
10. Cf Seligman, A Sheep in Wolf's Clothing: The American Law Institute Principles of
Corporate Governance Project, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 325, 331 (1987) ("nomination of direc-
tors by anyone other than incumbent management [is now] virtually impossible").
11. According to a study published by the Investor Responsibility Research Center
(IRRC), during the 1989 proxy season there were only 20 proxy contests, of which 12 were
pursued to conclusion, in a population of over 15,000 public companies. Lieberman & Cobb,
Proxy Contests Fewer, Quieter in 1989, 6 IRRC CORP. GOVERNANCE BULL. 106 (July/Aug.
1989). During the 1988 season there were only 30 proxy contests. Id.
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pared by management. The routine application of "shareholder
democracy," however, is anything but democratic.
12
Federal law supports this tradition of the self-perpetuating board. SEC
rule 14a-8, the "shareholder proposal rule," 3 provides that shareholders
holding at least $1000 or 1% of a corporation's stock, whichever is less,
14
may advance and circulate to other shareholders at the corporation's ex-
pense certain categories of generally innocuous proposals. The rule specifi-
cally excludes, however, proposals relating to an "election to office."'"
Thus, this rule denies a non-management shareholder, regardless of the ex-
tent of the shareholder's ownership or the merits of the shareholder's nomi-
nee, a practical mechanism for nominating even a single directoral
candidate.
The shareholder may lobby the board of directors or its nominating com-
mittee, but little incentive exists for those men and women to upset their
existing organizations.' 6 Alternatively, the shareholder may choose to un-
dertake an independent proxy solicitation, which with legal, printing, and
professional solicitation fees may often cost millions of dollars,' 7 with only a
scant chance of reimbursement."8 Only someone mounting an out-and-out
contest for control is likely to assume this expense. Coupled with the spe-
cific complicity of the SEC, the process of directoral selection remains, as it
was before 1934, the exclusive preserve of corporate management.
Directoral selection appears to be of particular importance to institutional
investors. Some institutions routinely attempt to influence the board compo-
sition of corporations in crisis, 9 and others cast "no" votes against manage-
12. Cf E. EPSTEIN, WHO OWNS THE CORPORATION 13 (1986) ("(Corporate elections]
are procedurally much more akin to the elections held by the Communist party of North
Korea than those held in Western democracies.").
13. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1990).
14. Id. § 240.14a-8(a)(1).
15. Id. § 240.14a-8(c)(8).
16. One respondent to a recent survey of corporate directors remarked that "as an incum-
bent, independent director, why should I be pleased to be ousted?" For a description of this
survey, see infra note 77 and accompanying text.
17. Challenger Harold Simmons spent more than $6 million for advertising, printing,
postage and proxy solicitation services in his 1990 proxy fight for control of Lockheed Corpo-
ration. Lockheed spent more than $8 million responding to Simmons' challenge. Pender, Big
Lockheed Investors Fare Well, San Francisco Chron., Mar. 30, 1990, at CI, col. 2.
18. See generally Machtinger, Proxy Fight Expenditures of Insurgent Shareholders, 19
CASE W. RES. 212 (1968) (discussing the difficulty insurgent shareholders face in getting reim-
bursed for costs of proxy fights).
19. See, e.g., O'Hara, Texaco Accepts Director Nominated by Shareholders, 6 IRRC CORP.
GOVERNANCE BULL. 6 (Jan./Feb. 1989) (institutional investors instrumental in placing John
Brademas on the board of Texaco after it entered Chapter 11 and shareholder Carl Icahn had
undertaken a contest for control); Pension Funds Urge Changes by Oil Firms, Wash. Post, July
1990]
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ment's proposed directoral slates in protest against undesirable management
policies.2" In addition, some institutions seek to persuade board members to
take specific actions, such as the dismissal of a chief executive officer, with
the implicit understanding that board replacement is a possible remedy for
noncompliance with their wishes.2 ' They have even attempted to intercede
in board deliberations concerning executive succession.22 In a recent proxy
fight at Lockheed Corporation, some institutional shareholders effectively
"sold" their vote to management in exchange for the right to name up to
three members of the Lockheed board.23 Many institutions are now seeking
access to the proxy 24 to regularize their directoral selection role.
These investors believe it is possible that empowering institutional share-
holders to nominate and effectively solicit votes for their own directoral can-
didates could produce significant benefits. First, access to the proxy might
reduce the antagonism between incumbent management and significant in-
vestors which results from sporadic and often contentious communication.
Second, access might enrich the process of decisionmaking by ensuring that
the board of directors has diverse points of view and is regularly apprised of
the concerns of knowledgeable key investors. Finally, access to the proxy
might reduce the likelihood-greatly feared by management-that key in-
vestors will tender into the first premium offer presented to them; having
placed a trusted nominee on the board, these investors might be more likely
5, 1989, at B2, col. 1 (citing efforts of members of the Council of Institutional Investors to
place an environmental expert on Exxon's board of directors); see also Cogan, Shareholder
Campaign on Environment Spreading, 6 IRRC CORP. GOVERNANCE BULL. 111 (July/Aug.
1989) (two major institutional investors urge six petrochemical companies to name an environ-
mentalist to their boards).
20. See, e.g., Lieberman, Election of Directors, Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Board
and Selection ofAuditors: 1989 Background Report J, IRRC CORP. GOVERNANCE SERV. J-2-
5 (March 1989) (stating that half of institutional investors surveyed in 1988 reported voting
against incumbent nominees for various reasons, including: approving greenmail or other anti-
takeover devices, where "inside" representation on the board was excessive, for poor attend-
ance or conflict of interest, or where all nominees were white males); see also O'Hara, New
York, Pennsylvania Funds Scrutinize Corporate Boards, 6 IRRC CORP. GOVERNANCE BULL.
143 (Sept./Oct. 1989) (the New York State Common Retirement Fund withheld votes from 60
board slates-representing 10% of its portfolio-during 1989 because they were not made up
of a majority of outside directors).
21. E.g., Rose & Hilder, Mounting Junk Woes Imperil First Executive and Chief Fred
Carr, Wall St. J., Jan. 29, 1990, at 1, col. 6.
22. White, GM Board Gets Letters From 2 Funds Concerned About Firm's Performance,
Wall St. J., Jan. 9, 1990, at A4, col. 1.
23. Simmons Loses, But Lockheed Shareholders Win, San Francisco Chron., Apr. 11,
1990, at Cl, col. 1.
24. "Access to the proxy," as used throughout this Article, refers to access for purposes of
directoral nomination. This term has been used elsewhere to include shareholder communica-
tions unrelated to directoral nomination. See infra note 184 and accompanying text.
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to accept management claims of a profitable long-term strategy than to cash
out for a short-term gain.25
Both contractarian scholars and mainstream corporate managers oppose
the idea of institutional access to the proxy. Contractarian scholars regard
the idea as inconsistent with the economic nature of the firm, and corporate
managers regard most shareholders, particularly institutional shareholders,
as so transfixed with "short-termism" that they are inappropriate partici-
pants in long-term governance decisions. 26 While these managers tradition-
ally tolerate creditor selection of directors,27 shareholder selection
apparently is less palatable, presumably because it is not accompanied by an
infusion of new cash.
Thinking about access to the proxy for purposes of directoral nomination
provides an opportunity to reconsider the value and the contours of corpo-
rate democracy in the 1990's. Shareholders are told that they may seldom
play a direct role in governance decisions because state law entrusts these
decisions to members of the board,28 while the SEC rules exclude them from
any meaningful role in the selection of that board. There is little wonder
25. Institutions-particularly public pension funds-are often exhorted to consider long-
term values, rather than seeking short-term profits, in order to minimize the impact of corpo-
rate debt on national competitiveness, alleviate the personnel dislocations which follow many
takeovers, and help preserve the integrity of the capital markets. See, e.g., GOVERNOR'S TASK
FORCE ON PENSION FUND INV., NEW YORK STATE INDUS. COOPERATION COUNCIL, OUR
MONEY'S WORTH 27 (1989) (urging the New York State pension funds to act as "patient
investors").
26. Corporate lawyer Joseph H. Flom has stated that institutional investors have a "15-
minute attention span." Their participation in corporate governance would be a "disaster."
Opinions Differ Widely on Institutions' Role in Corporate Governance, 4 Corp. Couns. Weekly
(BNA) No. 49, at 8 (Dec. 13, 1989). Citicorp's CEO John Reed views institutions with similar
disdain:
The interest of an institutional investor is too short-term. You know, all you would
need on my board is three big funds that own 25 percent of my stock, and hell, they'd
have me selling off the [credit] card business, which is worth a lot of money. Hell,
those guys would sell it off, and they wouldn't care if it was there the next morning,
because they would have sold their [stock] position.
Andrews, Deconstructing the Mind of America's Most Powerful Businessman, MANHATTAN,
INC., May 1990, at 69.
27. See generally Note, Equitable Subordination and Analogous Theories of Lender Liabil-
ity: Toward a New Model of "Control." 65 TEX. L. REV. 801, 822 (1987) (citing loan clauses
permitting the lender to select directors or officers); Comment, Insights Into Lender Liability:
An Argument for Treating Controlling Creditors as Controlling Shareholders, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 1321, 1337 (1987) (citing lender's change-in-management clause permitting it to call
substantial loan in the event board approves "unacceptable" management). It is very common
for bankers to serve on the boards of client corporations. See D. KoTz, BANK CONTROL OF
LARGE CORPORATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES Appendix B (1978).
28. E.g., Paramount Comms., Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
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that shareholder voting is so easily discounted as a cumbersome fiction, ex-
cept in the context of contested takeover battles.29
This Article explores the rule excluding directoral nomination from the
cost-sharing advantages of rule 14a-8, and the exclusionary tradition which
the rule supports. It then reconsiders the alternative of permitting at least
some shareholders to make direct nominations of directoral candidates, with
the particulars of nominating and supporting information to be included in
management's proxy at the corporation's expense.3° Part I of this Article
briefly examines the historical directoral selection practices which led to the
enactment of the proxy provisions of the Exchange Act. Part II reviews two
mechanisms which developed independently of the Exchange Act-cumula-
tive voting and the "independent nominating committee," both of which had
the potential to facilitate shareholder involvement in directoral selection, but
failed to achieve that result. In Part III, this Article analyzes various access
to the proxy proposals advanced by the SEC, and by commentators from
many disciplines, as supplements to cumulative voting and the committee
nominating process. If adopted, these proposals would afford shareholders
the right to nominate directoral candidates and share the costs of nomina-
tion with other shareholders. Part IV reviews the role played by the SEC
and its staff, which has alternately promoted and discouraged shareholder
access to the proxy.
Part V of this Article considers the policy arguments in opposition to and
in favor of access to the proxy and explores some of the logistical problems
inherent in any workable access proposal. Finally, Part VI advocates an
access to the proxy regulation that would recognize a role in directoral selec-
tion for substantial shareholders with some demonstrated long-term com-
mitment to a public company, provide a structure for these shareholders to
share with other shareholders the cost of advancing the candidacies of the
directoral nominees of their choice, and distinguish the essentially benign
nature of directoral nomination by these shareholders from the more preda-
tory efforts of those shareholders whose goal is to transfer managerial con-
trol in its entirety.
The benefits of this proposal are likely to be threefold. First, it will stimu-
late those involved in existing directoral selection practices, generally board
nominating committees, to be more inclusive and less parochial in their
29. See Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class Common Stock,
54 U. Cmi. L. REV. 119, 134 (1987).
30. This reconsideration is timely, in light of indications that the SEC has undertaken a
review of the entire proxy solicitation process. As Proxy Use Widens, New Rules are Urged,
N.Y. Times, June 15, 1990, at DI, col. 3 (various groups' petitions for a comprehensive review
of the proxy voting system are being given "serious consideration" by the Commission).
[Vol. 40:37
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searches for candidates for board positions. Second, it will lead to an
elected board characterized by increasingly diverse backgrounds and loyal-
ties, with a consequent impact on directoral decisionmaking likely to be of
value to shareholders.3 2 Third, it will lead to enhanced share value.
33
This Article concludes that shareholder voting is both practical and im-
portant beyond the boundaries of the takeover market. Shareholder voting
can constructively influence the basic governance structure of public compa-
nies and their share values, even in the absence of a takeover threat, and even
in the presence of the traditional problems of collective action and uncom-
pensated voter choice. This view of-shareholder democracy goes beyond im-
precise, though tantalizing, analogy to the public electoral process. 34 It
regards as important, both economically and psychologically, the process of
consensual decisionmaking, the value of managerial diversity, and the restor-
ative powers of competition.
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE SHAREHOLDER PARTICIPATION STATUTE
In the years leading up to the Great Crash of 1929, managers of large
public companies seldom concerned themselves with shareholder relations:
Unfettered by external restraints such as active shareholder partici-
pation or supervisory regulatory agencies, directors managed with
virtually no duty to account for their actions. Corporate corrup-
tion ran rampant as a result. Insider trading scams and fraudulent
corporate reporting, designed to entice purchases of bogus stock,
became commonplace. Finally, in the early twenties, companies
began to experiment with what one critic terms "the crowning in-
famy of all," the issuance of non-voting [common] shares. The
corporation could easily deny the shareholder the right to vote and
thereby solidify its authority by issuing non-voting shares. Several
dramatically inequitable transactions occurred as a result. 5
Though the New York Stock Exchange ultimately responded to this par-
ticular form of abuse by enacting its one common share/one vote rule in
1926,36 other abuses continued and new ones soon emerged. In his impas-
31. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 251-55 and accompanying text.
33. See infra note 329 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 381-83 and accompanying text. In public democratic theory, the exist-
ence of competing factions is a given. See J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND
DEMOCRACY 269 (1943) ("[Democracy is] that institutional arrangement for arriving at polit-
ical decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive
struggle for the people's vote.").
35. Simons, The Effect of Dual Capitalization on the Shareholder- Voting Rights Come
Full Circle, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 841, 849 (1988).
36. J. LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER 172, 186-87 (1958).
1990]
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sioned condemnation of disenfranchising corporate practices common in the
mid-1920's,37 Harvard's William Z. Ripley noted widespread use of pyrami-
dal holding companies,38 statutory abrogation of shareholder preemptive
rights, 39 exclusive distribution of non-voting preferred shares to the public
with voting control retained by management, 4° substitution of non-voting
preferred shares for voting preferred shares,4 and numerous examples of
obfuscatory disclosure.42
During this period, shareholders enjoyed little, if any, meaningful role in
the selection of corporate directors. The "overwhelming majority" of stock-
holders were " 'little people,' that is, members of the investing public who
own small blocks of stock, who know little or nothing about the corporate
activities; whose advice is not sought in running the corporation and proba-
bly would be worth little if it were given.",4 3 These shareholders found at-
tendance at annual meetings to voice complaints or to vote their interests
impractical; accordingly, the tradition of tendering proxies to management
selected representatives evolved.
In theory, proxy voting was a courtesy that corporate managers extended
to shareholders to facilitate shareholder participation in corporate govern-
ance. In practice, managers selected proxy holders, made their services
available to shareholders, and directed the proxy holders to cast their
votes--ostensibly on the shareholders' behalf-as directed by the managers
who appointed them. As Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means described it,
"since the proxy committee [was] appointed by the existing management,
the latter [could] virtually dictate their own successors."" William 0.
Douglas complained that, because of this practice, most corporate boards of
this era, even those purporting to some level of independence, were "con-
trolled or dominated by the managers."" Often, Douglas said, corporate
managers enjoyed a "feudal tenure.
' 46
37. W. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET (1927).
38. Id. at 317.
39. Id. at 39.
40. Id. at 124.
41. Id. at 125.
42. Id. at 162-83. The use of voting trusts as a disenfranchising device was also common.
Loomis & Rubman, Corporate Governance in Historical Perspective, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 141,
153 (1979).
43. Berle, Stockholders: Their Rights and Duties, HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRA-
TION 374, 374-75 (1931), quoted in Loomis & Rubman, supra note 42, at 143.
44. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 87
(1932).
45. Douglas, Directors Wo Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1305, 1307 (1934).
46. W. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 16 (1940).
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Many proposals-ranging from increased disclosure to mandatory outside
directors-were advanced during this period to enhance "shareholder pro-
tection" generally and to increase the shareholders' oversight role specifi-
cally.4 7 In a particularly prescient recommendation, Adolph Berle
encouraged institutional shareholders-at that time made up primarily of
insurance companies and banks holding depositors' stock in trust-to assem-
ble in a "permanent protective committee" to represent shareholder interests
in the face of managerial abuses.4"
Institutional holders, however, were reluctant to undertake this role. Typ-
ically, when dissatisfied with managerial performance, institutional investors
followed the "Wall Street Rule," selling their stock rather than engaging in
costly and generally futile efforts at reform. Cultural norms in the financial
community reinforced the notion that attacking management was ungentle-
manly.49 Consequently, few proxy fights or contests for corporate control
occurred during the period preceding the Exchange Act.5 ° As a result, insti-
tutional engagement in the governance of publicly held corporations was un-
common, and mechanisms of participation, other than physical
representation at shareholders' meetings, were nonexistent.
When Congress passed the Exchange Act to authorize a federally regu-
lated uniform proxy solicitation process, it considered these practices and
broadly empowered the SEC to develop rules encouraging shareholder par-
ticipation in governance matters.
5 ' When Congress chose not to leave proxy
47. See generally Loomis & Rubman, supra note 42, at 171-79 (describing the "corporate
reform" proposals of the 1930's).
48. A. BERLE, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATION FINANCE 39 (1928).
49. See generally J.R. EHRLICH & B.J. REHFELD, THE NEW CROWD-THE CHANGING
OF THE JEWISH GUARD ON WALL STREET (1989) (describing the shifting emphasis in invest-
ment banking from carefully negotiated transactions and nurturing long-term business rela-
tionships to hostile "megadeals" and high-risk trading in the period 1945-1989).
50. Cf C. HENDERSON & A. LASHER, 20 MILLION CARELESS CAPITALISTS 75 (1967)
("There were only a handful of cases in corporations of any kind where small stockholders got
together to battle entrenched management and directors, and only one or two in which they
won.").
51. See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12, 77 (1934).
Fair corporate suffrage is an important right that should attach to every equity
security bought on a public exchange. Managements of properties owned by the
investing public should not be permitted to perpetuate themselves by the misuse of
corporate proxies.... [T]he proposed bill gives the ... Commission power to control
the conditions under which proxies may be solicited with a view to preventing the
recurrence of abuses which have frustrated the free exercise of the voting rights of
stockholders.
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1934).
A comprehensive review of the legislative history of Section 14 of the Exchange Act appears
in Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and Corporate Democracy, 23 GA. L.
REV. 97 (1988). Professor Ryan's conclusions concerning Congress' intent in enacting Section
1990]
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solicitation issues to state oversight, it declined the opportunity to focus ex-
clusively on exchange regulation and disclosure requirements in the new is-
sue market. That Congress specifically addressed shareholder voting as an
object of regulatory attention suggests a commitment both to suffrage and to
participatory directoral selection as important elements of public policy.
This view would have been consistent with the idea that highly placed busi-
ness leaders had transformed public companies into private governments.52
II. Two DEVICES WHICH HAVE FAILED TO STIMULATE
SHAREHOLDER PARTICIPATION-CUMULATIVE VOTING AND
THE INDEPENDENT NOMINATING COMMITTEE
Many commentators have proposed schemes designed to magnify the
voice of shareholders in corporate governance discourse and to improve
management accountability to shareholders. Modest proposals include
mandatory cumulative voting and the use of a board nominating committee
comprised solely of independent, though incumbent, directors.
A. Cumulative Voting
Cumulative voting, a venerable and simple means of facilitating share-
holder involvement in directoral selection, developed out of the impassioned
advocacy of Joseph Medill, publisher and editor of the Chicago Tribune
from 1855 to 1899."3 Medill, an influential delegate to the Illinois Constitu-
tional Convention in 1870, was enamored with the political philosophy of
John Stuart Mill who embraced the notion of minority, or "proportionate,"
representation in elected legislatures.54 While successfully arguing for pro-
portionate representation in the election of representatives to the Illinois
General Assembly through cumulative voting, Medill also encouraged cu-
mulative voting in private corporations." Illinois adopted a mandatory cu-
mulative voting provision16 that became the model for many states.
Proponents of cumulative voting argued that minority representation on
the board would lead to thoughtful discussions of controversial governance
matters and permit early detection and deterrence of any unacceptable self-
dealing by those in control of the board. Opponents argued that minority
14, however, have been challenged. See, e.g., Dent, Proxy Regulation in Search of a Purpose:
A Reply to Professor Ryan, 23 GA. L. REV. 815 (1988).
52. A. GRIMES, AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 441 (1955).
53. 6 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 491-92 (1933).
54. Campbell, The Origin and Growth of Cumulative Voting for Directors, 10 Bus. LAW.
No. 3, 3, 4 (1955).
55. Id. at 4-5.
56. Id. at 6.
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representation interfered with effective, collegial decisionmaking and squan-
dered the valuable time and energy of directors on peripheral issues.
While cumulative voting was crafted for close corporations, it also applied
to more widely held enterprises--suggesting that a significant minority of
shareholders in such companies could enjoy proportional representation on
their boards. Consequently, because cumulative voting provided the only
opportunity for non-management shareholders to influence the election of
directors who presumably would represent their interests," it became the
most popular subject of shareholder proposals after the 1942 adoption of the
predecessor to rule 14a-8.-"
Early shareholder advocates regarded cumulative voting as the most im-
portant plank in their reform platform. 9 These advocates understood, how-
ever, that cumulative voting, without some funding mechanism, amounted
to an illusory grant of shareholder power. Even shareholder advocate Lewis
Gilbert, cumulative voting's strongest partisan, conceded that "[i]t is usually
next to impossible for [a shareholder of a publicly held company] to nomi-
nate and elect his own independent representatives to the board of directors.
It will take cumulative voting and a better mechanism for allowing share-
holders to make independent nominations to remedy this."'
The popularity of cumulative voting has declined in recent years. Hun-
dreds of companies, in connection with the enactment of anti-takeover de-
vices, have eliminated cumulative voting and replaced it with straight voting
and staggered boards.6' Even California, the last holdout of mandatory cu-
mulative voting, recently made cumulative voting optional for its domicili-
ary corporations.62 Even where cumulative voting remains, under the
current system, where the nominators bear all costs of solicitation, its use is
cost prohibitive unless a substantial transfer of control is sought.63 In the
57. Cumulative voting does not ensure that minority shareholders will be independently
represented on the board. However, it does afford shareholders the opportunity to build alli-
ances and work together to elect their own representatives. Eg., Maddock v. Vorclone Corp.,
17 Del. Ch. 39, 147 A. 255 (1929).
58. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 3347 (Dec. 18, 1942) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact
file).
59. L. GILBERT, DIVIDENDS AND DEMOCRACY 106, 182 (1956).
60. Id. at II (emphasis added).
61. Corporate Proxy Voting System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunica-
tions and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 22-27
(1989) (testimony of James E. Heard, Managing Director, Analysis Group, Inc.) [hereinafter
Proxy Hearings].
62. CAL. CORP. CODE § 708 (West 1988).
63. Occasionally, a shareholder willing to assume the costs of an independent solicitation
may take advantage of cumulative voting. For example, at the June 1989 annual meeting of
Pacific Enterprises, the parent company of Pacific Gas & Electric Co., shareholder Sam Wein-
stein, who is also the regional director of the Utility Workers Union Region 5, received ap-
1990]
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absence of a mechanism for including shareholder-initiated nominations on
the corporate proxy statement and the official proxy ballot, cumulative vot-
ing provides neither a significant restraint on managerial domination over
board composition nor a genuine vehicle for the expression of shareholder
discontent.
B. The Independent Nominating Committee
In 1982, the American Law Institute (ALI) published Tentative Draft No.
I of the Principles of Corporate Governance and Structure: Restatement and
Recommendations. 64 The Draft proposed that the boards of all large pub-
licly held corporations 65 consist primarily of independent directors. It fur-
ther advocated the selection of all nominees for board positions by a
nominating committee composed exclusively of directors "who are not of-
ficers or employees of the corporation, including at least a majority of direc-
tors who have no significant relationships with the corporation's senior
executives. ' '6 6 The purpose of this proposal was to "provid[e] an independ-
ent locus of responsibility for the selection and nomination of directors and
the composition of the board. ' 67 The Draft noted that "there is often a
natural tendency for a director who is brought onto the board directly by the
chief executive officer to feel special obligations to the chief executive. "68
The "independent locus of responsibility," however, was not premised on
any special duty to shareholders or on the likelihood that shareholders could
better communicate with a nominating committee than they could with
CEO's. The ALI drafters apparently valued "independence" for its own
sake, and not as a mechanism to increase shareholder influence on directoral
selection.
proximately 75% of the votes needed to place him on the company's board. His success was
attributed largely to the use of the Employees' Stock Ownership Plan and the availability of
cumulative voting. Not surprisingly, Pacific Enterprises eliminated cumulative voting before
the 1990 board elections. Revised Procedure Helps Company Resist Union Official's Drive for
Board Seat, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at A-4 (Mar. 6, 1990).
64. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982) [hereinafter Tent. Draft No. 1]. The project
has since been renamed PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS.
65. A "large publicly-held corporation" is defined as a corporation that, as of the record
date for its most recent shareholders' meeting, had both 2,000 or more record holders of its
equity securities and $100 million in total assets. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 1.16 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1984).
66. Tent. Draft No. 1, supra note 64, § 3.06(a)(1) (citations omitted).
67. Id. comment c, at 101-02.
68. Id.
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This proposal proved uncontroversial because many public companies had
already adopted some form of nominating committee,69 and both the Ameri-
can Bar Association70 and the Business Roundtable 7 1 advocated the use of
non-management controlled nominating committees in public companies.
Moreover, the ALI Reporter noted that this proposal would in no way ex-
clude in-house managers from the nominating process. The CEO, in partic-
ular, would remain involved:
[T]he chief executive officer can be expected to be highly active in
recommending and discussing candidates with the committee and
is recruiting candidates for the board. Indeed, the chief executive
officer's active participation in recruitment is often an important
and perhaps essential element in convincing high-quality individu-
als to become directors.72
Thus, although the Business Roundtable decried the Tentative Draft and its
generally inflexible prescriptive nature,7 3 it tacitly supported the nominating
committee idea.
In practice, the nominating committee has failed as a means of both dis-
tancing the directoral selection process from the CEO and facilitating share-
holder involvement in corporate governance. So-called "independent
directors" are seldom that at all.7 4 According to one observer with substan-
tial access to corporate boards, "nominating committees are a sham."'75
With few exceptions, the CEO still dominates the nominating committee,
which accedes to the CEO's wishes. 76 Nominating committees rarely seri-
69. Id. comment a, at 98.
70. Corporate Director's Guidebook, 32 Bus. LAW. 5, 35-36 (1976).
71. Statement of the Business Roundtable: The Role and Composition of the Board of
Directors of the Large Publicly Owned Corporation, 33 Bus. LAW. 2083, 2110 (1978).
72. Tent. Draft No. 1, supra note 64, § 3.06(a)(1) comment c, at 102-03. Shareholders
could also be involved. The ABA proposal took notice of the possibility of shareholder input
to nominating committee deliberations. "This procedure will, it is believed, be a more effective
and workable method of affording access to the nominating process to individual shareholders
than a direct 'right' of nominating in the corporation's proxy materials." Corporate Director's
Guidebook, supra note 70, at 35.
73. STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S
PROPOSED "PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS" 33 (Feb. 1983).
74. See generally Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Vil-
lage?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 611-13 (1982) (noting the disinclination on the part of "in-
dependent directors" to keep management at arm's length due to several psychological and
social considerations); Cox & Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations
and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 43 (1985).
75. Proxy Hearings, supra note 61, at 12-16 (testimony of Dale M. Hanson, CEO, Califor-
nia Public Employees Retirement System).
76. Id. at 59.
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ously solicit shareholder input or advance shareholder nominated
candidates. 7
In a recent review of the proxy statements distributed to shareholders of
125 large public companies during the 1988 proxy season,'78 thirty-seven (or
30%) had no standing nominating committee.79 Of those companies with
nominating committees, five were chaired by the company's CEO.80 Many
other companies listed the CEO as a member, although not the chair, of
their nominating committees. Six companies referred their nominating deci-
sions to an Executive Committee."l
Whether or not these companies had nominating committees, only sixty-
nine (or 55%) of the companies gave any indication in their proxy state-
ments that they would accept directoral nominations from shareholders.1
2
77. In 1989, the author surveyed 85 men and women who served on the nominating com-
mittees of S&P 500 corporations during fiscal year 1988; thirteen of these committee members
responded. The survey requested their estimate of the percent of directoral candidates whose
names appeared on the official corporate ballot during their tenure who were recommended
initially by the CEO, by other members of the board of directors, or by any shareholder other
than the CEO or members of the board, including institutional investors. The responses uni-
formly identified the CEO as the primary source of directoral nominees-the minimum re-
ported in any company was 50% of all nominees. The respondents more typically stated that
90-100% of all nominees were initially recommended by the CEO. Shareholders accounted for
5% or less of all nominees. One respondent dismissed the input of shareholders as being no
more than "one person recommending [himself]-with little or no qualifications." None of the
respondents routinely sought the input of key institutional investors, even though these inves-
tors are usually well known to committee members.
78. The documents underlying this study [hereinafter Proxy Statement Review] are on file
with the author.
79. Id.; e.g., ALBERTO-CULVER CO., PROXY 3 (Dec. 10, 1987); AMERICAN HOME PROD-
UCTS CORP., PROXY 6 (Mar. 15, 1988); APPLE COMPUTER, INC., PROXY 3 (Dec. 7,1987); E.I.
DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND CO., PROXY 3 (Mar. 29, 1988); MARRIOTT CORP., PROXY 6
(Mar. 29, 1988); THE NEW YORK TIMES Co., PROXY 7-14 (Mar. 8, 1988); THE WALT DIs-
NEY CO., PROXY 8 (Jan. 8, 1988).
80. See Proxy Statement Review, supra note 78; e.g., CAMPBELL SOUP CO., PROXY 7, 10
(Oct. 16, 1987); EXXON CORP., PROXY I I (Mar. 28, 1988); THE GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER
CO., PROXY 6, 15 (Feb. 22, 1988); H.J. HEINZ Co., PROXY 5 (Aug. 3, 1987).
81. See Proxy Statement Review, supra note 78; e.g., BAKER HUGHES, INC., PROXY 9
(Dec. 16, 1987); BAUSCH & LOMB, INC., PROXY 2 (Mar. 18, 1988); DAYTON HUDSON CORP.,
PROXY 6 (Apr. 22, 1988); MATTEL, INC., PROXY 4 (Mar. 27, 1988).
82. See Proxy Statement Review, supra note 78. The SEC requires this information for
public companies with standing nominating committees. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a- 101 Item 7(e)(2)
(1990). One reason offered to explain why so many companies fail to create nominating com-
mittees is that they wish to avoid having to disclose shareholder recommendation procedures.
Olson, "Proxy Statement Disclosures as to the Operations of the Board of Directors: Board
Committees, Board Meetings, Resignations and Removals of and Disagreements with Direc-
tors," in Proxy Statements and Annual Meetings Under the New SEC Rules, LAW & Bus. 11,
18 (1979), quoted in SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 96TH
CONG., 2D SESS., SEC STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 117 (Comm. Print
1980) [hereinafter SEC STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY].
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Of these companies, many conceded that they had not established proce-
dures for reviewing shareholder nominations,8 3 while others described elabo-
rate and deterrent procedures, either embodied in corporate bylaws or
management tradition. 4 These procedures included a common requirement
that the shareholder proponent provide the company with biographical and
all other information necessary to comply with the disclosure requirements
of the federal proxy regulations before the nominee would be considered. 5
Fifteen companies even required the shareholder proponent to supply an ex-
ecuted consent form from the nominee before the company would consider
the nominee. 6 Surely these procedures were not designed to maximize
shareholder input to the directoral selection process or to generate top-qual-
ity nominees.
An individual typically seeks a corporate directorship only after careful
consideration and, under existing nominating practices, some assurance of
acceptance by the committee in control. A board member of a large indus-
trial company generally receives a retainer in the range of $10,000 to
$50,000, plus deferred compensation, and meeting fees ranging upwards to
$2500 per meeting. 7 A directorship position requires a commitment of
twenty-four to thirty-six full days per year88 and a willingness to enter into
confidential and sometimes quite intimate relationships with other directors,
especially during a business crisis. In addition, a directorship carries the
potential for both legal liability and public exposure. Absent an acceptable
alternative means of nomination, such as the one suggested in this Article, it
is difficult to imagine an able directoral candidate giving a signed consent to
83. See Proxy Statement Review, supra note 78; e.g., GENERAL INSTRUMENT CORP.,
PROXY 3 (May 20, 1988); SQUARE D Co., PROXY 6 (Mar. 15, 1988); W.W. GRAINGER, INC.,
PROXY 12 (Mar. 30, 1988).
84. See Proxy Statement Review, supra note 78; e.g., ABBOTT LABORATORIES, PROXY 5
(Mar. 7, 1988); BAUSCH & LOMB, INC., PROXY 2 (Mar. 18, 1988); CBI INDUSTRIES, INC.,
PROXY 4 (Mar. 25, 1988); REYNOLDS METALS CO., PROXY 14 (Mar. 7, 1988).
85. See Proxy Statement Review, supra note 78. Required information includes share
ownership, business experience and positions held during the last five years, other director-
ships, involvement in legal proceedings, personal or family business or other similar relation-
ships with the corporation, any of its subsidiaries, or with the corporation's officers and
directors, and personal or familial indebtedness to the corporation. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101
Item 7 (1990).
86. See Proxy Statement Review, supra note 78; e.g., BALLY MANUFACTURING CORP.,
PROXY 4 (Mar. 23, 1988); GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORP., PROXY 5 (Mar. 22, 1988); KRAFT, INC.,
PROXY 5 (Mar. 23, 1988); MCGRAW-HILL, INC., PROXY 6 (Mar. 24, 1988); THE QUAKER
OATS CO., PROXY 11 (Sept. 11, 1987); TIME INC., PROXY 9-10 (Mar. 14, 1988).
87. HEWITr ASSOCIATES, COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR OUTSIDE DIRECTORS IN
THE FORTUNE 100 INDUSTRIALS-1988.
88. Sherman, Pushing Corporate Boards to Be Better, FORTUNE, July 18, 1988, at 58, 62-
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a shareholder to make, in essence, a "cold call" on the nominating commit-
tee with a petition promoting her nomination in hand. 9
In recent years, many institutional investors, rather than consenting to the
proprietary practices of board nominating committees, have attempted to
participate in the directoral nominating process. In 1988, the California
Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS), the nation's largest public
pension fund, submitted a shareholder proposal under rule 14a-8 to Texaco,
Inc., to provide for the establishment of a Stockholders' Advisory Commit-
tee made up of nine of the company's largest shareholders or their represent-
atives. CalPERS envisioned this Committee providing input into the
directoral nomination process. Although CalPERS later withdrew this pro-
posal when Texaco's management agreed to nominate a directoral candidate
from a list submitted by CalPERS,9a the fund submitted similar proposals
for the creation of shareholders' advisory committees for inclusion in the
1990 proxies of TRW, Avon, and Occidental Petroleum. 9'
CalPERS generally prefers a less formal approach, and has undertaken a
"multi-year program in which it will seek to achieve the level of cooperation
and support necessary to increase shareholder input into the nomination
process." 92 Specifically,
CalPERS has identified at least one company from its portfolio
that has: (1) consistently performed poorly over the last several
years, in comparison to its market; and (2) exhibited insensitivity
toward its shareholders through the adoption, without shareholder
approval, of numerous anti-takeover provisions. During the next
12 months, executives from CaIPERS will attempt to meet with the
management of this company to discuss the fund's concern with
the company's performance. Although CaIPERS' goal is to attain
management support through communication and mutual respect,
if the managers fail to consider the fund's interests, the second 12-
89. It is fair to ask why capable candidates would be willing to subject themselves to a
competitive selection process when officially nominated, rather than just unofficially recom-
mended, by a shareholder. The answer to this question will ultimately depend on a number of
considerations. These include: the stature and credibility of the nominators, a developing
consensus that candidates nominated under an access rule are equal to those candidates nomi-
nated by management, and the existence of ambitious and able candidates who are not part of
the traditional pool from which corporate directors have been drawn.
90. See Clark, Why Dale Hanson Won't Go Away, INST'L INVESTOR Apr. 1990, at 84.
91. CalPERS withdrew the proposals at TRW and Occidental when those companies
agreed to meet with CalPERS to discuss improved shareholder participation. The proposal
appeared on Avon's ballot at its May 3, 1990, annual shareholders' meeting and was narrowly
defeated. Letter from Kayla Gillan, CaIPERS Assistant General Counsel, to the author (Apr.
5, 1990) (on file at the Catholic University Law Review).
92. Koppes & Gillan, The Role of Pension Fund Investors in the Election of Corporate
Directors, 2 INSIGHTS No. 12, at 11, 13 (Dec. 1988).
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month period will involve establishing a broad level of support
from fellow shareholders. Shareholder proposals, soliciting votes
against incumbent management, and, as a last resort, a proxy con-
test may be considered.93
At one point, CalPERS supported shareholder access to the proxy.94 Al-
ternatively, it suggested a formal role on the nominating committee for ma-
jor institutional investors.9 5 The recent CalPERS petition to the SEC,
urging overhaul of existing proxy voting regulations, 96 abandons both posi-
tions, perhaps because of CaIPERS' success in demanding a governance role
even in the absence of an access rule.97 Other institutional investors, how-
ever, are increasingly expressing an interest in playing a meaningful and
ongoing role in directoral selection.9" In a 1989 survey of institutional inves-
tors, the Investor Responsibility Research Center found that 43% of the
respondents favored access to the ballot proposals, 26% disfavored them,
and 31% indicated that they would consider such proposals on a case by
case basis.99 These responses reflect a substantial increase in support for
access proposals when compared to a similar survey conducted the previous
year.OO The Council of Institutional Investors, representing $300 billion in
assets, has also expressed interest in the access issue. ot
93. Id.
94. Proxy Hearings, supra note 61, at 70 (written answers of Dale M. Hanson to subcom-
mittee questions); Letter from Richard H. Koppes, CaIPERS General Counsel, to the author
(Aug. 22, 1989) (on file at the Catholic University Law Review).
95. Sullivan, Two of Texaco's Institutional Holders To Seek a Role in Nominating Direc-
tors, Wall St. J., Aug. 17, 1988, at 5, col. I.
96. See Letter from Richard H. Koppes, CaIPERS General Counsel, to Linda C. Quinn,
Director, Division of Corporation Finance, Securities and Exchange Commission (Nov. 3,
1989) (on file at the Catholic University Law Review).
97. See Clark, supra note 90, at 29. CaIPERS' CEO regularly meets with Texaco's man-
agement, has met with the CEO of General Motors, and is working with TRW's management
on corporate governance concerns. Id. at 84. "We'd just as soon avoid the proxy vote,"
CalPERS' chief executive has said. "We don't like to be adversarial." Id.
98. A motivating factor, according to one fund manager, is the refusal of existing boards
to take the institutional investors seriously. " 'They respond surprisingly poorly to our con-
cerns' ..... 'We have a limitation of 10% ownership of a company. Management won't listen
to us when we own 3%.'" Hollie, Activism Not Role for Firms. PENSIONS & INVESTMENT
AGE, Oct. 2, 1989, at 24 (quoting John Brennan, president of The Vanguard Group, which
manages $45 billion in assets).
99. L. KRASNOW, VOTING BY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON CORPORATE GOVERN-
ANCE ISSUES IN THE 1989 PROXY SEASON 22 (1989). Of those responding to the survey, 64%
of the public funds, 38% of the investment managers, and 18% of the universities, founda-
tions, and church groups favored equal access to the proxy. Id. at 23.
100. Id.
101. O'Hara, Council, Roundtable to Discuss Director Nominations, 6 IRRC CORP. Gov-
ERNANCE BULL. 58-59 (Mar./Apr. 1989).
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III. DIRECT ACCESS TO THE PROXY PROPOSALS
Neither cumulative voting nor the widespread use of independent nomi-
nating committees succeeded in providing an effective role for shareholders
in the selection of directoral candidates or in the formulation of board poli-
cies. Many proposals have attempted to create such a role and to resolve the
access to the ballot problem in diverse ways. Some proposals involved radi-
cally overhauling the corporate governance structure, with shareholder ac-
cess to the proxy merely an element of the larger scheme. Most proposals
advocated a straightforward attempt to achieve greater shareholder repre-
sentation within the existing governance structure.
A. The Early Access Proposals
In 1942, the SEC proposed an amendment to the then-existing proxy rules
that required inclusion of shareholder-designated directoral nominees in the
annual corporate proxy statement. 10 2 Poorly crafted and widely criticized
by corporate managements consumed with problems of wartime production,
the proposal was soon abandoned.' 3
The first resurrection of the access issue after the war appeared in an arti-
cle by Mortimer M. Caplin, later appointed Commissioner of Internal Reve-
102. The proposed Rule provided, inter alia:
No authority shall be sought to vote a proxy upon the election of any person to
any office for which a bona fide nominee is not named in the proxy statement. The
name of each nominee of the persons making the solicitation shall be set forth in the
form of proxy in such a manner that the person solicited can strike out the name of a
nominee for whom he does not wish to vote. In the event a security holder has
notified the management pursuant to Item 5(M) of Schedule 14A of an intention to
nominate and support a nominee or nominees the name of each such nominee shall
also be set forth in the form of proxy together with a form of ballot in which the
person solicited can indicate that he wishes his securities voted for such nominee and
a statement to the effect that the proxy may be voted for the election of the nominees
proposed by the management unless the person solicited indicates he wishes his se-
curities voted for another nominee or other nominees and specifies the nominee or
nominees proposed by the management for whom he does not wish his securities
voted. In the event that security holders notify the management of an intention to
nominate and support more than twice as many nominees as there are directors of
the issuer, the management may select, on any equitable basis, name and furnish the
required information concerning only twice as many nominees as there are directors.
Note, A Proposal for the Designation of Shareholder Nominees for Director in the Corporate
Proxy Statement, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1139, 1154 n.79 (1974).
103. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 3347 (Dec. 18, 1942) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact
file). "The principal reasons given for this decision were that unqualified persons might be
nominated, that too many candidates might be nominated, and that the shareholders would
become confused and improperly mark their proxies." Hetherington, When the Sleeper
Wakes: Reflections on Corporate Governance and Shareholder Rights, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV.
183, 214 (1979).
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nue. 1° The article complained that the post-Exchange Act proxy voting
machinery, like that which preceded the Act, was completely dominated by
corporate managers. Noting that shareholders lacked any practical low-cost
means for making directoral nominations, Caplin advocated that sharehold-
ers of public companies should have a "real channel for the free nominations
of all directors."' 1 5 Caplin then proposed a formula for determining the
maximum number of directoral candidates, including those nominated by
management, which could be submitted to shareholders on the company's
proxy. t°6 Alternatively, he suggested a rule that would permit individual
companies to determine the manner in which directoral nominations could
be submitted.'0 7 Finally, Caplin argued that one position on the board of
directors should be set aside exclusively for direct shareholder
nomination. O
Criticism of Caplin's proposal focused primarily on his jurisdictional
claims that section 14 essentially empowered the SEC unilaterally to adopt
his proposal as a matter of federal law. According to Caplin, the Commis-
sion at the time was "not that aggressive," and regarded his ideas as "a little
far out."" 9 The access to the proxy issue then lapsed for nearly twenty
years.
B. The Access-on-Demand Theory
In the 1970's, Professor Melvin Eisenberg brought greater depth to the
access discussion in his article Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 110
104. Caplin, Shareholder Nominations of Directors: A Program for Fair Corporate Suffrage,
39 VA. L. REV. 141 (1953).
105. Id. at 152.
106. Id. at 152-53.
107. Id. at 153. This portion of Caplin's proposal was similar to that advanced by the
Gilbert brothers, Lewis and John, who had long urged that:
[Ilndependent nominations, of either a single candidate for the board of directors or
an entire insurgent slate, must be carried in the management proxy statement just as
shareholder proposals now are carried. In the first place, the proxy statement is not
properly the management's despite the usual designation, but it is the corporation's
with all shareholders sharing its costs. Thus a proper place for the presentation of a
proxy challenge to management is the proxy statement which legally and ethically
belongs to the shareholders ....
This reform... is a crucial one for the movement of independent public sharehold-
ers. It should receive, along with the ever-growing demand for cumulative voting,
constant and unremitting attention.
L. GILBERT, supra note 59, at 166-67.
108. Caplin, supra note 104, at 152.
109. Telephone interview with Mortimer Caplin, now of Caplin & Drysdale, Washington,
D.C. (May 24, 1990).
110. 83 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (1970).
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and his book THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION."' Both works chal-
lenged the notion that shareholders lack a means of access to the corporate
proxy statement. Noting the shareholders' exclusive right to elect corporate
directors, Eisenberg argued that shareholders enjoy a corollary right to nom-
inate candidates for board positions which, because "the proxy system is
today's shareholders' meeting," ' 1 2 includes access to the proxy materials for
the purpose of making the nomination known to other shareholders." 3 Ei-
senberg urged shareholders to demand the right to include their board candi-
dates in the proxy statement, even in the absence of the sort of SEC or
legislative action proposed by Caplin. Eisenberg noted that the marginal
cost of adding shareholder nominated directoral candidates to the corporate
proxy statement would be minimal, and that the cost could be further re-
duced by adopting exclusionary by-laws which would impose a standing re-
quirement in the form of a minimum ownership percentage."'
Eisenberg emphasized a principle of neutrality in matters of ballot access.
Examining the case law that permitted management to utilize the corporate
proxy machinery to solicit shareholder support on "issues of policy," but not
"issues of personnel," Eisenberg found the distinction "incapable of mean-
ingful application. '""' As a consequence, Eisenberg discovered, manage-
ment routinely used the corporate proxy solicitation to seek support for its
directoral candidates in contests for control, without incurring personal fi-
nancial obligations. Eisenberg argued that fairness and fiduciary principles
required granting nonmanagement shareholders the same privilege.
Little came of Eisenberg's proposal in the short run. Although he encoun-
tered no immediate feedback,16 his ideas surfaced repeatedly as part of the
growing literature on corporate accountability during the 1970's.
C. The "Social Responsibility" Proposals of the 1970's
A number of commentators explored ballot access issues throughout the
1970's. Following a seminar on the Corporation in Modern Society, student
Robert Shwartz published a widely cited Note" 7 urging the creation of a
mechanism that would allow shareholders to select directoral nominees who
would be designated as such on the corporate proxy statement." 8 He ex-
111. M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION (1976).
112. Eisenberg, supra note 110, at 1505.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1510.
115. M. EISENBERG, supra note 111, at 105.
116. Telephone interview with Melvin Eisenberg, Professor of Law, University of Califor-
nia, Berkeley (May 24, 1990).
117. Note, supra note 102.
118. Id. at 1146-48.
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plored and rejected three possible means of achieving this result: share-
holder proposals on a corporation-by-corporation basis, revision of state law
on a state-by-state basis, and revision of the listing requirements of the New
York Stock Exchange. 19
Concluding that the SEC's proxy regulation powers would be the most
effective vehicle for generating shareholder access, Shwartz considered the
specifics of such a plan, focusing first on the "standing" question.120 Asking
how many shares a shareholder should own or control to be entitled access
to the proxy, he argued that "[t]he standard should be sufficiently high to
ensure that shareholder sponsors will represent a 'significant interest' of the
corporate electorate" 12 1 and to guard against or minimize the harassment of
management. 122 Nevertheless, he advocated a "minimal" ownership re-
quirement for entitling shareholders to nominate directoral candidates, pre-
ferring to rely on a numerical limitation, or "cap," on the total number of
candidates listed in any proxy statement 123 as the primary medium for con-
trolling runaway proxies filled with nominations.
124
Shwartz also examined some logistical questions related to the access is-
sue, including the determination of an appropriate formula for selecting
nominees in the event "too many" candidates' names were submitted, and
the options for dealing with unsigned ballots. In a key lapse of real-world
understanding, however, he failed to appreciate that putting together a nom-
inating group might constitute "solicitation" under rule 14a-1.125
119. Id. at 1148-54.
120. Id. at 1157-59.
121. Id. at 1157. The notion of requiring some significant showing of electoral support
before. having one's name appear on the ballot is common in public suffrage. See, e.g., Ander-
son v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788-89 n.9 (1983) (states have an "undoubted right to require
candidates to make a preliminary showing of substantial support in order to qualify for a place
on the ballot."); American Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 782 (1974) (state may require
minor political parties to demonstrate a "significant, measurable quantum of community sup-
port" through petition signatures, as a condition of ballot access); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S.
431,438 (1971) (state may require independent candidates to submit signatures equal to 5% of
those eligible to vote for the office sought at the last election).
122. Note, supra note 102, at 1157.
123. Id. at 1159.
124. States can effectively cap the number of candidates whose names may appear on a
general election ballot. E.g., Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 199 (1986) (state
may exclude from the general election ballot any minor party's candidates, when such candi-
dates in the primary election did not receive at least I% of all votes cast for the office sought).
See generally Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 712 (1974) (citing historical efforts at limiting the
length of the ballot).
125. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-I (1990); see infra notes 338-46 and accompanying text.
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Other commentaries followed, addressing similar issues.' 26 For example,
who would be subject to liability for misstatements in descriptive materials
contained in the proxy statement in support of the shareholder nominated
directoral candidates?12 7 What limits would be placed on electioneering to
avoid the application of rule 14a- 11, the proxy contest rule?
128
Finally, a new voice joined these recurring and largely technical discus-
sions of shareholder access to the proxy. In TAMING THE GIANT CORPORA-
TION,1 2 9 consumer advocate Ralph Nader and his colleagues advocated
federal chartering of large publicly held corporations, establishing an exclu-
sively "outside" board of directors, and the "institutionalization of a new
profession: the full-time 'professional' director."' 3 ° Under this model, these
directors would be well paid and well staffed to induce them to work full
time, even at the cost of possible disharmony with the operating execu-
tives. 131 Moreover, the Nader group proposed assigning each director a par-
ticular constituency, such as employees, consumers, neighboring citizens,
shareholders, or other groups.132 Each director would be responsible for the
concerns of his or her constituents when attending to corporate governance
matters. Underlying these proposals was a selection and nomination process
that wholly excluded incumbent management:
[A]ny shareholder or allied shareholder group which owns. 1 per-
cent of the common voting stock in the corporation or comprises
100 or more individuals and does not include a present executive of
the corporation, nor act for a present executive, may nominate up
to three persons to serve as directors. This will ... increase[ ] the
likelihood of a diverse board by preventing any one or two sources
from proposing all nominees.
... All campaign costs would be borne by the corporation. [Cu-
mulative voting would be required.]' 3 3
All of these proposals shared the ultimate goal of broadening the corpora-
tion's mission to encompass protection of every aspect of society. A decade
later, however, new voices joined in the quest for access to the proxy. Their
126. E.g., Black, Shareholder Democracy and Corporate Governance, 5 SEC. REG. L.J. 291
(1978); Feis, Is Shareholder Democracy Attainable?, 31 Bus. LAW. 621 (1976); Weiss, Disclo-
sure and Corporate Accountability, 34 Bus. LAW. 575, 593 n.65 (1979).
127. Feis, supra note 126, at 633.
128. Id.; see infra notes 349-54 and accompanying text.
129. R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976).
130. Id. at 121.
131. "Under normal circumstances there should be a healthy friction between operating
executives and the board to assure that the wisest possible use is made of corporate resources."
Id. at 122.
132. Id. at 125.
133. Id. at 127-28.
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ultimate purpose was quite different-the protection of incumbent manage-
ment from hostile takeovers.
D. The "Anti-Takeover" Proposals of the 1980's
In 1987, Martin Lipton, critic of corporate takeovers and "inventor" of
the poison pill, strongly urged comprehensive reform of the tax and federal
securities laws to curb hostile takeover activity, accompanied by a "renewal
of shareholder democracy."' 134 He proposed that:
[T]he federal securities laws [should] be amended to allow any
shareholder, or group of shareholders, with more than $5 million
in market value of the corporation's shares free and equal access to
the corporation's proxy machinery at the corporation's expense.
Shareholders with less than a $5 million stake would remain free to
pursue independent proxy solicitations."'
Lipton advanced this proposal to provide "a means of making manage-
ment responsive to the needs of shareholders and other corporate constituen-
cies." '136 He argued that "shareholder democracy" was far preferable to the
"hostile tender offer as a device for disciplining management. '137 Further,
he advocated a central role for institutional shareholders in corporate re-
form, noting the expertise they might bring to corporate decisionmaking
once freed from their fixation on short-term gain:
Institutional shareholders will be able to guide corporate manage-
ment in the long-term interest of the corporation and all its constit-
uencies. To the corporation's benefit, its shareholder constituency
will remain relatively stable. The diversity of its institutional own-
ers, moreover, will ensure that a variety of views is expressed over
time, with the attendant benefits of pluralist corporate
democracy. 1
3 8
Professor Louis Lowenstein continued to examine the role of shareholder
voting in reducing abuses in the takeover market in his book, WHAT'S
WRONG WITH WALL STREET: SHORT-TERM GAIN AND THE ABSENTEE
SHAREHOLDER, 13 1 published shortly after the 1987 market break. Lowen-
stein asked how shareholders, especially institutional investors, could be en-
couraged to perform better as corporate monitors given their herdlike
134. Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 66 (1987).
135. Id. at 67-68 (footnotes omitted).
136. Id. at 6.
137. Id. at 68-69.
138. Id. at 69.
139. L. LOWENSTEIN, WHAT'S WRONG WITH WALL STREET: SHORT-TERM GAIN AND
THE ABSENTEE SHAREHOLDER (1988).
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behavior and nomadic turnover in holdings.'" As one response, he pro-
posed granting shareholders the exclusive right to nominate and elect, "sepa-
rately from the nomination [and election] of directors generally, a significant
but still minority number of additional directors, e.g., 20-25% of the
board."'' Lowenstein designed this proposal to encourage the nomination
and election of candidates put forward by, and accountable to, institutional
investors. 4 2 This proposal would create a new class of "very independent"
directors, 143 who nevertheless would be subject to all the fiduciary obliga-
tions of other board members.
Professor Lowenstein envisioned a procedure which would allow any
shareholder to propose one or more candidates for the reserved positions.
The shareholders as a group would then receive a final list of candidates
consisting of approximately twice the number of candidates as available
directoral positions, with the selection comprised of the candidates receiving
the largest number of nominations.'" Lowenstein argued that his plan
would permit "open[ing] up the nomination process, without fear that it will
somehow be trivialized by corporate gadflies and others whose interests may
be primarily personal, social, or political."
1 45
A subsequent Wall Street Journal commentary, relying largely on Euro-
pean models, advocated a more radical version of Lowenstein's dual class
board. 146 Under this proposal, public companies would have two governing
bodies: first, a group of "loyal cabinet advisers" 141 selected by management
and accountable only to management; and second, a distinct group of "su-
pervisory directors"' 48 selected by shareholders from candidates nominated
both by management and individual shareholders.' 49  Non-management
nominees would have to demonstrate some minimum level of support-for
example, 3% or $500,000 of a corporation's stock-to appear on the corpo-
rate ballot.' 50 Only the supervisory directors could be held accountable to
140. Id. at 5, 8.
141. Id. at 209 (emphasis added).
142. Id. at 210.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 209-10.
145. Id. at 210.
146. Nadel, More Power to the Stockholders, Wall St. J., June 26, 1989, at A8, col. 4.
147. Id. at A8, col. 5.
148. Id.
149. Id. In Germany, a comparable two-tier structure is mandatory. In France, the struc-
ture is optional. Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern Corpora-
tion: Officers, Directors, and Accountants, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 375, 409 (1975); Munyon,
Shareholders' Rights in the Common Market.: A Comparative Study, 9 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
191, 208 (1976).
150. Nadel, supra note 146, at A8, col. 5.
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shareholders. That is, shareholder derivative suits for breach of fiduciary
duty could only be brought against these directors and not against the
"cabinet."'
E. Congressional Access Proposals
Occasionally, Congress has considered the access issue, usually in connec-
tion with proposed anti-takeover legislation. The first bills to incorporate
access to the proxy provisions appeared in the early 1980's, when Senator
Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) introduced the "Protection of Shareholders'
Rights Act of 1980" '' i2 and Representative Benjamin Rosenthal (D-N.Y.)
introduced the "Corporate Democracy Act of 1980."'1 3 While the issue
died quickly in 1980, an increase in hostile takeovers and resultant defensive
activities during the mid-1980's' 54 brought renewed interest in shareholder
democracy issues.
Several bills which encompassed access to the proxy provisions were intro-
duced in the 100th Congress. Senator Donald Riegle (D-Mich.) and former
Senator William Proxmire (D-Wis.), respectively the current and former
chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, introduced the "Tender Offer
Disclosure and Fairness Act of 1987."'-" As amended, the bill provided
shareholders owning 10% or more of a company's stock with access to the
proxy for purposes of either responding to management's directoral nomina-
tions or proposing their own.1 56 After extended floor debate in the summer
151. Id. at A8, col. 6.
152. S. 2567, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 8(a) (1980). This bill provided:
Shareholders of an affected corporation, in advance of the meeting at which direc-
tors are to be elected, shall have the right to nominate candidates for the board of
directors of such affected corporation if each such candidate nominated for a direc-
torship by a shareholder is supported by the holder or holders of one-half of I per
centum of shares outstanding at the time the name of such candidate is sought to be
placed in nomination.
Id., quoted in SEC STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 82, at A57.
153. H.R. 7010, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 105(a) (1980). This bill provided that
"[s]hareholders of voting stock of any corporation subject to this Act shall have the right to
nominate candidates for the board of directors of such corporation." Id., quoted in SEC STAFF
REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 82, at A58. The bill authorized the
SEC to establish threshold requirements for access to the ballot for shareholder nominated
directoral candidates. Id.
154. Completed mergers increased in value from $33 billion in 1980 to $226 billion in 1988.
23 MERGERS & ACQUISITIONs ALMANAC No. 6, at 53 (1989).
155. S. 1323, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987).
156. Id. § II as amended, reprinted in 19 INST. ON SEC. REG. 383 (1987).
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of 1988, the bill stalled over a controversial amendment prohibiting poison
pills, and the Democratic leadership permitted it to die.'
3 7
During the same term, Representatives John Dingell (D-Mich.) and Ed-
ward Markey (D-Mass.), respectively the current Chairman of the House
Energy and Commerce Committee and Chairman of the House Subcommit-
tee on Telecommunications and Finance, introduced the "Tender Offer Re-
form Act of 1987.""'58 The Dingell-Markey bill entitled any shareholder
with the greater of either 3% of the voting power or $500,000 worth of
shares in any public company to access to the corporate proxy machinery to
nominate directoral candidates.' 59 This bill, along with its Republican
counterpart,"' ° died without reaching the House floor. Later, Congressman
Markey indicated his willingness to introduce another access proposal. '6'
In the 101st session of Congress, Senators Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio)
and William Armstrong (R-Colo.) jointly introduced "The Corporate Take-
over Reform Act of 1989."' 162 This bill provided that any shareholder or
shareholder group representing 3% or more of a company's voting shares
may submit in proxy materials statements or counterproposals on transac-
tional issues and the nomination of directoral candidates. These statements
and counterproposals would be afforded "equal space, coverage, and treat-
ment" as is conferred on management's statements and proposals.' 
63
IV. THE MERCURIAL ROLE OF THE SEC IN PROMOTING, THEN
THWARTING, SHAREHOLDER ACCESS TO THE PROXY
The Securities and Exchange Commission has played an interesting role in
the debate over the importance of shareholder access to the proxy. After the
Commission initiated the idea in 1942, 6' thirty-five years passed before the
Commission readdressed the issue. Since then, the Commission has moved
157. Special Report. Buyouts Leading List of Hot Issues as Congress Faces Busy Year in
Securities, 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 130, 134-35 (Jan. 20, 1989).
158. H.R. 2172, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
159. Id. § 6.
160. H.R. 2668, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (the Lent-Rinaldo bill).
161. McGurn, Congress Moves to Pension, Shareholder Issues, 6 IRRC CORP. GOVERN-
ANCE BULL. 115 (July/Aug. 1989). Representative Markey's proposal would allow stockhold-
ers who own the greater of either 5% or $500,000 of a company's outstanding shares to
nominate candidates to the board of directors. Id.
162. S. 1244, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
163. Id. § 8. During the same term, Senator Richard Shelby (D-Ala.) introduced the "In-
vestor Equality Act" which provides that any shareholder or shareholder group holding at
least 10% of the voting power of a company's securities will be given ballot access to both
respond to management proposals and board nominations and apparently to initiate their own
proposals and board nominations. S. 1658, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. § 9 (1989).
164. See supra text accompanying note 102.
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slowly from embracing the access idea to abandoning it, both at the policy
level and at the operational level.
A. The Commission's Shifting Regulatory Posture
In the wake of the corporate democracy movement of the mid-1970's and
in response to proposals such as Ralph Nader's,165 the Commission resur-
rected its general interest in shareholders' rights and its specific interest in
access to the proxy. The influence of then-Chairman Harold M. Williams, a
vigorous advocate of the wholly independent board of directors, 166 and then-
SEC Enforcement Division Director Stanley M. Sporkin 16 7 greatly contrib-
uted to the Commission's interest.
On April 28, 1977, the Commission issued a release seeking public com-
ment on several corporate governance issues, including the question of
shareholder access to the proxy. ' 68 One of the stated reasons for the inquiry
was the Commission's recognition "that under the existing regulations
shareholders often may not be provided adequate opportunities to partici-
pate meaningfully in corporate governance or the corporate electoral pro-
cess.' 1 69 After considering preliminary responses, the Commission focused
on several specific questions relating to shareholder access and then resolic-
ited public comment.' 70 More than 300 witnesses testified before the Com-
mission on these and related questions.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 129-33.
166. See speeches cited in Branson, Countertrends in Corporation Law: Model Business
Corporation Act Revision, British Company Law Reform, and Principles of Corporate Govern-
ance and Structure, 68 MINN. L. REV. 53, 98 n.211 (1983).
167. In June 1977, in a speech before the Business Week Conference on Corporate Direc-
tors, Sporkin presented his "six-point" program to improve corporate governance. The first of
his six points was to ensure that "public shareholders have board representation even though it
might be disproportionate to their holdings." Ferrara & Goldfus, The Government and Corpo-
rate Governance: What It Hears and How It is Responding, in A. COHEN & R. LOEB, CORPO-
RATE GOVERNANCE 107 (1979).
168. Re-examination of Proxy Rules, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 13,482, [1977-78
Transfer Binder] Fed Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,130 (April 28, 1977).
169. Id.
170. The specific questions posed were:
(1) Should shareholders have access to management's proxy soliciting materials for
the purpose of nominating persons of their choice to serve on the board of directors?
(a) Would a Commission rule granting shareholders such access be in conflict
with state law? Is this result consistent with Congressional intent in enacting
Section 14(a)?
(b) If the Commission determines to adopt such a rule, what type of rule would
be most appropriate? What criteria, if any, should be applied to shareholders
who wish to have access to management's proxy soliciting materials for the
purpose of making nominations?
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The Commission initially approached access to the proxy and other gov-
ernance issues cautiously. The Commission's order, characterized as "Stage
I" of a contemplated three-stage response to concerns about corporate gov-
ernance, proposed modest amendments to the existing disclosure require-
ments concerning board candidates and governance structures.17 ' "Stage
II," to come shortly thereafter in the form of a "comprehensive staff report"
would, according to the SEC, address some of the more complex questions
raised in the governance hearings. These issues would include: "existing
checks on corporate conduct, available shareholder remedies, the role of the
board of directors and the need for structural board reforms and clarification
of the directors' responsibilities, and the respective roles of the private sec-
tor, shareholders, the Commission, the self-regulatory organizations and
Congress in corporate accountability."' 72
Several months later, but before the issuance of any staff report, the Com-
mission adopted the new proxy rules in final form. The Commission added
substantial new material to the required disclosure on executive compensa-
tion.' 7 3 The SEC required directoral candidates to provide information in
the proxy statement concerning any conflict of interest transactions with the
corporation, and it required companies to identify standing board commit-
tees, disclose directoral attendance records, and publish information con-
cerning directoral resignations.174
(i) For example, should the right to make nominations in management's
proxy materials be conditioned on the ownership of a minimum per-
centage of dollar value of a class of securities?
(ii) Should there be a limitation on the number of nominees which must
be included? If so, what limitation would be appropriate?
(iii) Should all nominations be screened by a nominating committee com-
posed of outside directors or other disinterested persons?
(iv) What disclosures should be required of shareholders who utilize
management's proxy soliciting materials for the purpose of making
nominations?
(c) Are there soliciting activities preliminary to (I) making a shareholder nomi-
nation in management's proxy materials or (2) an election contest to which the proxy
rules should not apply? ...
(d) Should shareholders utilizing management's proxy materials for the purpose
of making nominations be subject to the requirements of Rule 14a-I 1 (Special Provi-
sions applicable to Election Contests)?
Hearings on Shareholder Communications, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 13,901, [1977-78
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 81,296, at 88,464 (Aug. 29, 1977).
171. Shareholder Communications, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 14,970, [1978 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,645 (July 18, 1978).
172. Id. at 80,576.
173. Management Remuneration, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 15,380, [1978 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,765 (Dec. 4, 1978).
174. Proxy Amendments, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 15,384, [1978 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,766 (Dec. 6, 1978). Several months later, the Commission
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Nearly two years passed before the publication of the Commission's
"Stage H1" report. The SEC STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTA-
BILITY, 17" when finally issued, continued the SEC's conservative approach
to the question of shareholder access to the proxy. Noting the "growth of
nominating committees" in the years leading up to the report's publica-
tion, 176 and the objections of the American Bar Association and others to
the notion of direct shareholder nomination of directoral candidates,"77 the
Staff proposed further study of nominating committees as a vehicle for
shareholder empowerment:
The staff believes that Commission action may be necessary to
facilitate shareholder participation in the corporate electoral pro-
cess. At the same time, we do not want to discourage the volun-
tary initiatives currently under way toward establishment of
nominating committees. We therefore recommend examining the
1980 proxy data with a view toward determining the extent to
which companies are establishing nominating committees and the
extent to which these committees are considering shareholder
nominations. If there is not sufficient progress, the staff recom-
mends that the Commission authorize it to develop a rule which
would require issuers to establish, beginning two years from adop-
tion of the rule, procedures for shareholder access to issuer proxy
material for the purpose of making shareholder nominations,
which procedures would be disclosed in proxy statements.178
No evidence exists that the Commission staff followed up on the Staff Re-
port after its issuance or that it reviewed the 1980 proxy materials to mea-
sure the effectiveness of corporate nominating committees. 1
79
proposed rules which would mandate a proxy card format permitting shareholders to vote for
or against individual directoral nominees. SEC Exchange Act Release 16,104 (Aug. 13, 1979).
These rules were subsequently adopted. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(a) (1986). In addition, these
rules entitle shareholders to information concerning previous adverse votes against directors
seeking reelection. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 Schedule 14A, Item 6(g) (1990).
175. SEC STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 82.
176. Id. at 99.
177. Id. at 108.
178. Id. at 125-26.
179. Recall that by 1981, John Shad, President Reagan's appointee, had replaced Chair-
man Williams, President Carter's appointee, and the world view of the SEC had changed sub-
stantially. Chairman Shad was said to have considered the SEC not as an independent agency,
but "more like 'the Agriculture Department, whose job is to promote the interests of farm-
ers.'" Siedel, Rule 2(e) and Corporate Officers, 39 Bus. LAW. 455, 470 (1984) (quoting
Welles, John Shad's Biggest Deal, INST'L INVESTOR, Apr. 1982, at 58).
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The closest attempt to a comprehensive review of nominating committee
practices during this period was a 1981 Conference Board report °80 that con-
tained the results of a 1980 survey by the American Society of Corporate
Secretaries of over 300 public companies with nominating committees. The
survey requested respondents to identify the sources of candidates for board
membership under the new nominating committee regime:' '
Not a Useful
Prime Source, Good Source, Source, or Has
Candidate Source Often Used Sometimes Used Not Been Used
CEO 262 52 1
Committee 177 92 21
members
Other board 184 124 7
members
Large or 12 66 204
influential
shareholders
Shareholders 1 16 259
generally
This report could hardly support the conclusion that shareholders were
finally finding a voice in the board nominating process.
The Commission's next announcement on the subject of shareholder
access to the proxy was a "concept" release inquiring with retrograde
curiosity "whether security holder access to the issuer's proxy statement
should be provided under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or left to
regulation under state law."' 8 2 This inquiry led to the 1983 amendments to
Rule 14a-8, substantially curtailing previously authorized means of access to
the proxy for substantive shareholder proposals. '
8 3
180. J. BACON, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES: THE NOMINATING COMMITTEE
AND THE DIRECTOR SELECTION PROCESS (1981).
181. Id. at 25 table 5.
182. Shareholder Proxy Proposals, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 19,135, [1982 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,262 (Oct. 14, 1982).
183. See generally Comment, The 1983 Amendments to Shareholder Proposal Rule 14a-8."
A Retreat from Corporate Democracy?, 59 TUL. L. REV. 161 (1984) (the amendments place
burdensome restrictions on shareholder participation in corporate governance and also
represent a movement away from the goals of corporate accountability).
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Thus, once in the thrall of Reagan-era deregulation, the SEC made no
further mention of requiring or facilitating direct shareholder nomination of
directors. Other issues took priority and, under the chairmanship of John
Shad, the Commission abandoned consideration of access to the proxy as a
mandatory public policy. This left open the possibility of a corporation-by-
corporation approach to the access issue by means of shareholder proposals.
Under this approach as well, the Commission, through the staff No-Action
Letter process, soon abandoned shareholder interests in favor of
management entrenchment.
B. The Staffis Reversal on Shareholder Self-Help Efforts 1980-1990
During the 1980's a number of access proposals were submitted to share-
holders under the shareholder proposal rule. A significant number of these
proposals attempted to create a mechanism which would enable communica-
tion between shareholders in response to management initiatives, rather than
create a new mechanism for shareholder initiatives as urged in this Arti-
cle."8 4 Many proposals, however, focused on the nomination process and
sought to permit direct nomination of directoral candidates by various cate-
gories of shareholders. '85
In 1980, a shareholder of Unicare Services, Inc. succeeded, over manage-
ment objection, in placing a proposal on Unicare's annual proxy ballot
which would permit any three shareholders to nominate a directoral candi-
date for inclusion on the proxy statement alongside management's slate of
184. A typical proposal, submitted at the 1989 Annual Meeting of Chevron Corporation,
read as follows:
RESOLVED, that the owners of Chevron recommend that the board of directors
adopt and implement the following policy:
In any proxy statement sent by Chevron to its shareholders, with respect to
any issue presented for decision by the shareholders (including candidates for
election as directors), there shall be allowed statements with regard to that issue
by beneficial owners of voting equity securities of Chevron. Such statements
shall receive treatment in the proxy statement, in terms of placement, coverage
and space, equal to the position of the board of directors or management of
Chevron.
CHEVRON CORP., PROXY (Mar. 20, 1989). An identical proposal was submitted to the share-
holders of Unocal Corp. and Amoco Corp.
185. Proposals to permit direct shareholder nomination have for years been a recurring
feature of the shareholder proposal landscape. Gaining access to the proxy to permit share-
holders to make direct nomination of socially conscious board candidates was one of the
planks of "Campaign GM" in 1971. Black, supra note 126, at 300 (Project on Corporate
Responsibility submitted a resolution to GM requiring management to include in its proxy the
names of any candidates nominated in a petition signed by 100 shareholders or by the owners
of 1,500 shares).
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candidates.' 86 In the same year, the International Human Rights Law
Group submitted a proposal to Mobil Corporation shareholders which
would permit "a reasonable number of stockholders and/or owners of a rea-
sonable number of shares to place candidates for the Board of Directors on
the Corporation's proxy statement, and have such candidates voted upon by
the shareholders."'
18 7
In 1981, the SEC staff required Union Oil Co. of California to include in
its proxy materials a proposal which would permit 500 or more individual
shareholders, "notwithstanding the number of shares they individually or
collectively represent,"' 1 8 to nominate directoral candidates and have their
nominations presented on the corporate proxy "in the same manner as any
and all other nominees presented for election."' 8 9 In 1983, the SEC staff
again required the company-by then renamed Unocal-to include in its
proxy statement a shareholder proposal which would permit shareholders
with 125,000 shares or more to nominate directoral candidates and have
their candidates' names and qualifications "put before other shareholders for
careful consideration by being included in ... the [corporate] proxy.""
During this period, issuers raised many objections to shareholder propos-
als seeking access for purposes of directoral nomination. For example, in
1988, Unocal shareholder Louise B. Wulff submitted a new access propo-
sal.'9' Wulff believed her proposal demanded not only shareholder dialogue
on matters submitted by management for shareholder approval, but also on
shareholder nomination of directoral candidates. 192 Unocal's management
strongly resisted the proposal. As permitted under SEC Rule 14a-8(d),' 93
Unocal sought a No-Action Letter from the SEC Division of Corporation
186. Unicare Services, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (May 13, 1980) (LEXIS, Fedsec li-
brary, Noact file).
187. Letter from Richard B. Lillich, Mobil Corp. shareholder, to Margaret M. Day, Secre-
tary, Mobil Corp. (Dec. 17, 1980) (containing shareholder proposal), reprinted in Mobil Corp.,
SEC No-Action Letter (Mar. 3, 1981) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file).
188. Letter by R.O. Hedley, Secretary, Union Oil Co. of Cal., to SEC (Jan. 7, 1981) (con-
taining shareholder proposal submitted by Eugene W. Dickey, Jr., Union Oil Co. of Cal. share-
holder), reprinted in Union Oil Co. of Cal., SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 29, 1981) (LEXIS,
Fedsec library, Noact file), af'd, Union Oil Co. of Cal., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 20, 198 1)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file).
189. Id.
190. Letter from Eugene W. Dickey, Jr., Unocal Corp. shareholder, to George C. Bond of
Unocal Corp. (Dec. 16, 1982) (containing shareholder proposal), reprinted in Unocal Corp.,
SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 24, 1983) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file).
191. Letter from Louise B. Wulff, Unocal Corp. shareholder, to R.O. Hedley of Unocal
Corp. (Dec. 27, 1987) (containing shareholder proposal), reprinted in Unocal Corp., SEC No-
Action Letter (Feb. 19, 1988) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file).
192. Interview with Kurt H. Wulff, President, McDep Associates, Inc. (Aug. 10, 1989).
193. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(d) (1990).
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Finance authorizing Unocal to exclude the proposal from its proxy state-
ment. Unocal argued, in part, that the proposal's inclusion would violate
rule 14a-8(c)(2)194 by permitting differential treatment of similarly situated
shareholders. In particular, Unocal argued that the proposal:
[W]ould give individual stockholders (or groups) free access to the
Company's proxy materials if they own $1,00(0,000 in equity secur-
ities of the Company. Other stockholders would be relegated to
whatever rights they may have under SEC Rule 14a-8 or which
might be voluntarily offered to them by the Company. We believe
this discrimination in favor of large stockholders and to the detri-
ment of small stockholders would cause the Company to violate
the [equal treatment] principle .... "
Unocal also took exception to Wulff's assertion that her proposal would per-
mit shareholder nomination of directoral candidates, arguing that direct
shareholder nomination would violate rule 14a-11196 which governs proxy
contests. 197
The SEC staff rejected Unocal's rule 14a-8(c)(2) "discriminatory treat-
ment" argument 98 and did not address the rule 14a- 1 proxy contest argu-
ment, finding that the specific language of Wulff's proposal did not require it.
In prior decisions, however, the SEC staff had resolved the rule 14a- 11 ques-
tion in favor of other proponents, holding that access proposals do not in-
volve a "solicitation . . . for the purpose of opposing a [management]
solicitation ... with respect to the election or removal of directors,"' 99 and
so could not be excluded from the ballot on that basis. 2 ° The staff also
194. Id. § 240.14a-8(c)(2) ("The registrant may omit a proposal . . . [i]f the proposal, if
implemented, would require the registrant to violate any state law or Federal law of the United
States, or any law of any foreign jurisdiction to which the registrant is subject .... ").
195. Letter from Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell to Unocal Corp. and Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher (Feb. 11, 1988), reprinted in Unocal Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 19, 1988)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file).
196. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-I1 (1990) (special rules applicable to solicitations "with respect
to the election or removal of directors at any annual or special meeting .... ").
197. Letter from Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher to SEC (Dec. 23, 1987), reprinted in Unocal
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 19, 1988) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file).
198. Unocal Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 19, 1988) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact
file).
199. See supra note 196.
200. See, e.g., Unocal Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 24, 1983) (LEXIS, Fedsec li-
brary, Noact file) (staff declined to exclude proposal that would provide access to shareholders
with 125,000 shares as violative of rule 14a- I I because "[lit appear[ed] to the staff that the
proposal relate[d] to the selection in subsequent years of nominees for election to the Board of
Directors and not to a solicitation in opposition to management's nominees"); Union Oil Co.
of Cal., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 20, 1981) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file), affig,
Union Oil Co. of Cal., SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 29, 1981) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact
file) (staff declined to exclude proposal that would permit 500 or more shareholders to collec-
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rejected management's invocation of rule 14a-8(c)(8) 2°' for the proposition
that access proposals for the purpose of shareholder nomination could be
excluded because they "relate[] to an election to office." 2 2
The SEC staff over the years had repeatedly rejected management objec-
tions to shareholder access proposals. In 1986, for example, a shareholder of
Newbery Corporation proposed a bylaw amendment that would permit ac-
cess to the proxy for purposes of directoral nomination by shareholders eligi-
ble to submit shareholder proposals.2"3 Newbery's management attempted
to exclude the proposal under rule 14a-8(c)(9), 2 4 arguing that any nomina-
tion by a shareholder would by definition be "counter to a proposal to be
submitted by the registrant at the meeting."20 5 Presumably because the pro-
posal itself was not "counter to" any management proposal pending before
the shareholders that year, the staff held the exclusion inapplicable, and de-
nied the requested No-Action Letter.20 6
In 1987, a shareholder of Chittenden Corporation proposed a mechanism
for shareholder nomination of "opposition candidates," including placement
of the nominees' "names, biographies, and photographs... in Annual Share-
tively nominate a directoral candidate as violative of rule 14a- 11, noting "rather than violating
rule 14a-I 1, in our view, the proposal would only require that the Board of Directors take the
steps necessary to establish procedures [for direct nomination]").
201. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(8) (1990) (management may omit a proposal, and any state-
ment in support thereof, from its proxy statement "if the proposal relates to an election to
office").
202. Unicare Services, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (May 13, 1980) (LEXIS, Fedsec li-
brary, Noact file) ("in our view this proposal does not related [sic] to the election of directors
at a particular meeting, but rather to the procedure to be followed to select nominees in gen-
eral"); see also Unocal Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 24, 1983) (LEXIS, Fedsec library,
Noact file) ("this proposal does not relate to the election of directors at a particular meeting,
but rather to the procedure to be followed to select nominees in general"); Mobil Corp., SEC
No-Action Letter (Mar. 3, 1981) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (access proposal is
"merely procedural in nature" and does not invoke rule 14a-8(c)(8)).
203. Newbery Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Aug. 11, 1986) (LEXIS, Fedsec library,
Noact file).
204. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(9) (1990) (management may omit a proposal, and any state-
ment in support thereof, from its proxy statement "if the proposal is counter to a proposal to
be submitted by the registrant at the meeting").
205. Id.
206. Newbery Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Aug. 11, 1986) (LEXIS, Fedsec library,
Noact file); see also American Airlines, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 26, 1980) (LEXIS,
Fedsec library, Noact file) (proposal permitting any three shareholders to propose a candidate
for inclusion in management's slate of directors is required to be included in the annual proxy)
affid. American Airlines, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Mar. 10, 1980) (LEXIS, Fedsec library,
Noact file).
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holder Meeting Notices. '20 7 Management objected on the ground, among
others, that the proposal related to a personal grievance and was beyond the
power of the corporation to effectuate.2"8 The staff rejected all of Chit-
tenden's claims.2' 9
The staff, in at least one case, overtly counseled shareholder proponents to
maximize the chances that the proponents' access proposal could be placed
on the ballot. In 1982, a group calling itself the TWA Shareholder Project,
Inc., proposed that "[t]he Board of Directors shall include in their slate of
nominees for election as Directors at each Annual Meeting at least four ac-
tive employees of TWA (exclusive of corporate officers)."' 210 While ruling
that the proposal, as drafted, unlawfully intruded upon the discretionary au-
thority of the board under Delaware law, 2" the staff suggested that:
If, however, the form of the proposal were changed to a recom-
mendation or request that the Board take the necessary steps to
effect the action contemplated by the proposal, we believe this de-
fect would be cured. As amended, staff is unable to conclude that
[there is] a sufficient legal basis for the proposition that Delaware
law would necessarily prohibit a by-law amendment requiring cer-
tain directors be nominated by the Company's shareholder-em-
ployees. We note in this connection that shareholders generally
have no choice in the nomination of the directors upon whose elec-
tion they vote.21 2
In light of this history of approval for shareholder access proposals, the
SEC staff's reversal on the access to the proxy issue in consecutive No-Ac-
207. Letter from John Jennings Crapo, Chittenden Corp. shareholder, to John F. McAteer
of Chittenden Corp. (Feb. 26, 1987) (containing shareholder proposal), reprinted in Chittenden
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Mar. 10, 1987) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file).
208. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(4), (6) (1990).
209. Chittenden Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Mar. 10, 1987) (LEXIS, Fedsec library,
Noact file).
210. Letter from Richard P. Barthelemy, Secretary, TWA Shareholder Project, Inc., to L.
Edwin Smart, Chairman of the Board, Trans World Corp. (Jan. 12, 1980) (containing share-
holder proposal), reprinted in Trans World Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 8, 1982)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file).
211. Trans World Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 19, 1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec library,
Noact file). In a similar case, a proposal submitted to Public Service Electric & Gas Co. set-
ting aside two seats on the board of directors for "two individual Shareholders to be selected
by nomination by any duly qualified Shareholder" was excluded because its language was di-
rectory rather than precatory. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 2,
1978) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file).
212. Trans World Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 19, 1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec library,
Noact file).
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tion Letters to Bank of Boston,2 13 Unocal, 2 14 Amoco, 21 5 and Thermo Elec-
tron 2 1 in early 1990 was a surprise. Typical of those rejected, the Amoco
proposal provided:
RESOLVED that the board of directors take whatever steps are
necessary to provide that, effective with the 1991 annual meeting,
in the event a shareholder or group of shareholders representing
more than $100,000 in market value of shares nominates a candi-
date for a position on the board of directors and secures that candi-
date's consent to be so nominated, that candidate's name and
accompanying biographical data shall appear in the corporate
proxy statement, and that candidate's name shall appear on the
corporate ballot sent to shareholders, in the same manner as if the




This proposal did not "set aside" board positions for any particular class
of candidates,2"' include the names of any proposed directoral nominees,
2 19
213. Bank of Boston, SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 26, 1990) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact
file) (proposal to permit any shareholder eligible to make a shareholder proposal to make a
directoral nomination may be excluded from the proxy pursuant to rule 14a-8(c)(8)).
214. Unocal Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 6, 1990) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact
file) (proposal to permit any shareholder who owns or controls at least 125,000 shares to make
a directoral nomination may be excluded from the proxy pursuant to rule 14a-8(c)(8)).
215. Amoco Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 14, 1990) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact
file) (proposal to permit any shareholder or group of shareholders representing more than
$100,000 in market value of the company's shares to make a directoral nomination may be
excluded from the proxy pursuant to rule 14a-8(c)(8)).
216. Thermo Electron Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Mar. 22, 1990) (LEXIS, Fedsec li-
brary, Noact file) (proposal to permit any shareholder eligible to make a shareholder proposal
to make a directoral nomination may be excluded from the proxy pursuant to rule 14a-8(c)(8)).
217. Letter from Jane E. Klewin to SEC (Dec. 21, 1989) (containing shareholder proposal
submitted by Kurt H. Wulff, Amoco Corp. shareholder), reprinted in Amoco Corp., SEC No-
Action Letter (Feb. 14, 1990) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file). The author of this Article
served as counsel to Mr. Wulff in connection with this proposal in the No-Action proceedings
before the SEC.
218. Cf Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (May 9, 1985) (LEXIS,
Fedsec library, Noact file) (proposal requiring a corporate employee to be put on manage-
ment's slate of nominees for directors may be excluded from the proxy); Allied Corp., SEC
No-Action Letter (Jan. 5, 1984) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (proposal to set aside a
board position for a non-management salaried employee is excludable from the proxy); Braniff
Int'l Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 5, 1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (propo-
sal requiring directors to nominate four employees to the corporate board "relates to the elec-
tion of specific individuals to the Company's Board ... and thus is excludable under Rule 14a-
8(c)(8)"); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 12, 1979) (LEXIS, Fedsec
library, Noact file) (proposal to set aside board positions for representatives of the American
Friends Service Committee, Friends of the Earth, or the Mobilization for Survival, as well as
for representatives of registrant's labor unions, may be excluded from the proxy); Chrysler
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 25, 1977) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (proposal to
set aside a board position for a nominee sponsored by the Stockholder Employees Committee
of Chrysler Corp. may be excluded from the proxy). But see IBM Corp., SEC No-Action
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or create a "dual class board" in violation of state law. 220 The proponent
fulfilled all the standing requirements of rule 14a-8. 221 His proposal was
neither duplicative of earlier failed proposals, and hence excludable under
rule 14a-8(c)(12),222 nor "vague and indefinite and, therefore, potentially
misleading," and hence excludable under rule 14a-8(c)(3). 223 Rather, the
proposal provided a procedure by which certain shareholders could make
nominations for inclusion on Amoco's proxy statement in future years,
similiar to the proposals at Unicare,224 Mobil,225 Unocal,226 American Air-
lines,227 Newbery,228 and Chittenden,229 which had successfully withstood
challenge before the SEC in preceding years.
By permitting Amoco to exclude this proposal from its proxy, the SEC
staff apparently changed its view of both rule 14a-8(c)(8), the "related to an
election" exception to the shareholder proposal rule, and rule 14a- 11, the
"proxy contest rule." In a letter promising no action if Amoco excluded the
proposal from the Amoco proxy, the staff stated "[i]nsofar as it seeks to
Letter (Dec. 19, 1985) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (refusing to exclude a proposal to
establish a board position in which the director would "represent the interest of [IBM] Share-
holders who are Company employees").
219. Cf Amerco, SEC No-Action Letter (July 12, 1989) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact
file) (proponent's submission of a slate of candidates to be included in the company's annual
proxy excluded based on rule 14a-8(c)(8)); Savin Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Mar. 15, 1989)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (same); Care Enter., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (May 5,
1987) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (same); Santa Fe S. Pac. Corp., SEC No-Action
Letter (Feb. 19, 1987) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (same); Simplicity Pattern Co., Inc.,
SEC No-Action Letter (Mar. 21, 1980) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (same).
220. Cf Detroit Edison Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 13, 1980) (LEXIS, Fedsec li-
brary, Noact file) (proposal to allow shareholders to nominate additional class of directors
creates two separate classes of directors, unequal in number, in violation of § 506(1) of the
Michigan Business Corporation Act).
221. Cf Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Apr. 13, 1987) (LEXIS,
Fedsec library, Noact file) (proponent's sale of his shares made him ineligible to submit
proposal).
222. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(12) (1990); see, e.g., Unocal Corp., SEC No-Action Letter
(Feb. 23, 1984) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (proposal to adopt certain directoral nomi-
nating procedures is duplicative of proposals included in the company's 1981 and 1983 proxy
materials and excludable under rule 14a-8(c)(12)).
223. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(3) (1990); see, e.g., Bank of New England, SEC No-Action
Letter (Feb. 4, 1990) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (access proposal excluded because it
is vague and indefinite); Commonwealth Energy Sys., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 27, 1989)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (same); American Elec. Power Co., SEC No-Action Letter
(Jan. 27, 1978) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (same).
224. See supra notes 186, 202 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 187, 202 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 188-90, 198 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
228. Id.
229. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
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implement a common ballot procedure, it appears that this proposal, rather
than establishing procedures for nomination or qualification generally,
would establish a procedure that may result in contested elections to the
board which is a matter more appropriately addressed under rule 14a-
11.99230
This change of position by the SEC staff was not its only reversal in 1990.
During the same proxy season, the staff reversed itself on proposals related
to golden parachutes 23' and the cessation of production of dangerous prod-
ucts. 232 These changes of position, however, favored shareholder propo-
nents, while the staff's new position on the access to the proxy issue favored
incumbent management.
A simple reason for the staff's change of course might be that the 1990
position is more "correct" under existing law than the staff's previous posi-
tions. In prior years, the staff may have failed to consider the long-term
implications of their decisions because they assumed that access proposals,
like most shareholder proposals, would not command substantial share-
holder support and could not win against management opposition. This as-
sumption, however, was beginning to prove unsupportable. By 1990, an
increasing number of shareholder proposals, particularly those initiated by
institutional investors, were winning majority votes.233 Accordingly, the
SEC staff may have, for the first time, considered the actual consequences of
shareholders enjoying direct access to the proxy, and found it unacceptable
under existing proxy contest rules.
V. THE WISDOM AND PITFALLS OF PROVIDING DIRECT ACCESS TO
THE PROXY
All of the proposals discussed in Parts III and IV invite obvious and more
subtle objections. Some critics cite the practical problems accompanying the
implementation of an access to the proxy rule, while others focus on the
230. Amoco Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 14, 1990) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact
file).
231. Transamerica Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 10, 1990) (LEXIS, Fedsec library,
Noact file) (proposal that the board discontinue golden parachute agreements with company
executives may not be excluded under rule 14a-8(c)(7)).
232. See Philip Morris Co. Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 13, 1990) (LEXIS, Fedsec
library, Noact file) (proposal requiring company to cease producing tobacco products by De-
cember 31, 1999, is not excludable under rules 14a-8(c)(1), (2) or (7)), affid, Philip Morris Co.,
SEC No-Action Letter (Mar. 14, 1990) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file).
233. In the 1990 proxy season, more shareholder proposals passed than in the preceding 40
years combined. 5 USA ADVOCATE No. 7, at I (July 1990).
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notion of corporate democracy itself.2 3 4 . After identifying, exploring, and
ultimately refuting the most colorable of these objections, this Article argues
that affirmative reasons exist for embracing a policy of limited shareholder
access to the proxy.
A. The Recurring Objections
1. Overseeing and Responding to Contested Directoral Elections Would
Waste Managerial Resources
Some critics worry that encouraging election contests by providing share-
holder access to the ballot may discourage competent incumbent directors
from seeking renomination and dissuade others selected by the incumbent
board, or a nominating committee, from putting themselves forward and
risking public rejection. 235 This argument comports with other protectionist
arguments which seek to defend the status quo by discouraging competitive
behavior. Thus, for example, corporate managers who lobby for tariffs or
other barriers to exclude quality foreign products from the market for goods
and services may also prefer costly proxy fights to exclude directoral chal-
lengers from the market for corporate control.
It is questionable whether management-selected directoral candidates
would refuse nomination in the face of competing bidders. Directoral ser-
vice provides substantial personal benefits to those chosen by management,
quite apart from financial considerations. 236 First, exposure to other enter-
2371 eod eetoprises provides learning and networking opportunities. Second, selection
by management to serve on a public company's board carries substantial
prestige.238 For service providers, such as commercial bankers, investment
bankers, or outside counsel, board service offers a means of bonding a lucra-
tive business relationship. Moreover, for those board members with previ-
ous service, the advantages of incumbency and "ballot position" within
234. See generally Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259
(1983) (criticizing the movement toward further empowerment of shareholders).
235. See Feis, supra note 126, at 640; Comment, Shareholder Democracy: A Description
and Critical Analysis of the Proxy System, 60 N.C.L. REV. 145, 163 (1981).
236. See supra text accompanying note 87.
237. See J. LORSCH, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA'S CORPORATE
BOARDS 26 (1990) (opportunity to learn is rated as the second most important reason cited by
directors for their acceptance of a board position); see also M. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH
AND REALITY 104-05 (1986 ed.) (one of two principal reasons why executives will serve as
directors is the opportunity to learn something new).
238. M. MACE, supra note 237, at 105-06. "Often it is like being invited to join an exclu-
sive club." C. ANDERSON & R. ANTHONY, THE NEW CORPORATE DIRECTORS: INSIGHTS
FOR BOARD MEMBERS AND EXECUTIVES 95 (1986).
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management's slate may provide additional incentives to run for
reelection.239
The real question is not whether the prospect of an election contest scares
off the occasional incumbent, but whether that prospect is likely to stimulate
boards to better directoral performance. As discussed in the next section,
psychological studies suggest that the existence of a challenger may result in
better board decisionmaking.
2. A Diversified Board is Likely to be an Ineffective Decisionmaking
Body
Some observers argue that a high degree of homogeneity and cohesiveness
leads to a more effective board of directors, and that the presence of "constit-
uency directors," including those elected by cumulative voting to represent
shareholder interests, disrupts the decisionmaking process.2" ° Others chal-
lenge the notion that a homogeneous board, especially one selected primarily
by the CEO, can perform effectively.24 1 Social scientists studying the condi-
tions which characterize efficient decisionmaking have found that homoge-
neity and cohesiveness, taken too far, can impair decisionmaking to the point
where, in the jargon of social psychologists, it becomes "pathological." This
impairment can result from premature closure of discussion, intolerance of
deviant points of view, pressure towards consensus, or the phenomenon re-
ferred to as "groupthink.9
242
"Groupthink" is "a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are
deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' strivings for una-
nimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses
of action."'243 It is common in the deliberations of corporate boards selected
in the traditional manner.
239. See Pound, Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight, 20 J. FIN.
ECON. 237 (1988) (noting the vote-getting advantages enjoyed by management in any proxy
contest due to unique characteristics of proxy voting); cf Sangmeister v. Woodard, 565 F.2d
460 (7th Cir.), cert. denied. 435 U.S. 939 (1978) (citing research findings correlating first ballot
position with electoral success).
240. Haft, Business Decisions by the New Board: Behavioral Science and Corporate Law, 80
MICH. L. REv. 1, 22-24 (1981).
241. E.g., Brudney, supra note 74, at 622 (the effectiveness of a traditional board is limited
by "structural bias," inadequate resources and the lack of economic incentives to monitor).
242. See generally Swap, Destructive Effects of Groups on Individuals, in GROUP DECIS!ON
MAKING 69-95 (1984) (groups exert pressure on members to reach a consensual decision that
is not necessarily the best decision).
243. 1. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND FIAS-
COES 9 (2d ed. 1982).
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Boards are frequently constrained by what one director has called the
"cult of politeness."'" 4 Another knowledgeable commentator has described
"a subtle set of unspoken norms" which inhibit robust discourse within the
confines of the boardroom.245 This pattern of conscious civility, while con-
ducive to a high comfort level in group situations, may also interfere with
the board's monitoring function. For example, many directors suppress
their concerns in board meetings for fear of appearing disrespectful of the
CEO or of indicating a vote of "no confidence." '24 6 Furthermore, cultural
norms mandate that directors interact only in structured board settings and
solely as peers, rather than informally with any one of them asserting leader-
ship over the others.24 7 Boards rarely vote other than unanimously on issues
of importance to the CEO.24 8
These behavioral patterns can ultimately lead to an institutional inability
to challenge the management-delivered view of corporate affairs and a result-
ing failure of the board to exercise sound and independent business judg-
ment.24 9 As one social psychologist noted, "[g]roup members may be so
concerned with maintaining positive interpersonal relations and reducing
conflict that they lose the ability or willingness to critically evaluate the risks
and advantages of decision alternatives. "250
Providing, within limits, for a more diverse and heterogeneous board of
directors is likely to improve, rather than impair, the quality of decisionmak-
ing.25" ' This is particularly true where "new" board members gain their seats
244. The Role of the Shareholder in the Corporate World.- Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Citizens and Shareholders Rights and Remedies of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1977) (statement of Mary Gardiner Jones, Pres., Nat'l Consumer League).
245.. J. LORSCH, supra note 237, at 91.
246. Id. at 93; M. MACE, supra note 237, at 55. This is particularly true among directors
who themselves are CEO's. One of the traditional mores of corporate upward mobility is
never to contradict or embarrass one's boss or "patron" in the presence of others, and always
to appear totally loyal to him or her. R. JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPO-
RATE MANAGERS 19 (1988).
247. J. LORSCH, supra note 237, at 93.
248. In a recent book about his experiences on the board of General Motors, Inc.. Ross
Perot disclosed that when he voted against a proposed acquisition of Hughes Aircraft Co. in
1985, it was the first time since the Depression that any member of the GM board had dis-
sented in any board decision. D. LEVIN, IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES 251 (1989).
249. E.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (directors failed to challenge
any aspect of or even to read proposed merger agreement).
250. Swap, supra note 242, at 83.
251. See, e.g., C. ANDERSON & R. ANTHONY, supra note 238, at 90. The authors argue
that:
(One] dimension of a good board is a balanced membership-balance of occupation,
experience, age, gender, race, geographical representation, and so on. In general it is
beneficial to have people from several different industries on the board. They can
bring important insights to board meetings, based on their varied experiences. It is
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following direct nomination by a substantial shareholder. In his landmark
study of corporate boards,252 Myles Mace found that traditionally selected
outside directors are especially passive as a group, are hesitant to risk embar-
rassment either to themselves or to the CEO, and seldom ask discerning
questions about ongoing or proposed corporate activities.25 3 However,
"[o]utside board members who own or represent the ownership of substantial
stock in the company are much more likely to ask discerning questions than
an outside director who does not own stock, or at least not very many
shares., 254 In addition, the presence on the board of one such director en-
courages other outsiders to get involved in the questioning of the CEO.2 5
The point is not to stimulate rancor among a factionalized board or to
create a new model of board composition in which shareholder nominated
directors are expected to play some oppositional role.256 Rather, the goal is
also helpful to have someone on the board with experience in the public sector, as
this person contributes a perspective frequently missed by the business person. An
academic can add still another perspective. Our point is that a board consisting of
persons with varied backgrounds can engage in discussions with a richness and
breadth that inevitably lead to better decision making. A board with diverse mem-
bership will also have an extensive network of contacts throughout industry, govern-
ment, and the professions, that can be useful to the company in many ways.
Id.
252. M. MACE, supra note 237.
253. Id. at 52-53.
254. Id. at 61 (emphasis added).
255. Id. at 64.
256. Absent some sense of unity among elected directors, a single director nominated by
anyone other than those on the official nominating committee might well face the treatment
portrayed in a recent NEW YORKER cartoon:
"Thank you. We're all refreshed and challenged by your unique
point of view. Now, we have many serious matters to discuss todtay,
so I suggest we stick with our agreed-upon agenda."
Reprinted with permission from the NEW YORKER
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to create an environment in which decisionmakers bring diverse perspectives
to the process, optimize their individual strengths, and resist the centripetal
forces of "groupthink." 2" Many models exist suggesting that this bonding
process can work.2 "8
If one accepts the monitoring role of the board, then any mechanism
which stimulates attentiveness and directoral activity is desirable. However,
giving shareholders the right to nominate is not equivalent to ensuring their
ability to elect a director of their own selection. Even where management-
nominated candidates prevail over shareholder nominees, the expressed con-
cerns of the nominators and the discontent over board actions which aroused
slumbering investors are likely to sensitize the newly elected board members.
The availability and occasional use of direct nomination, rather than degrad-
ing the board's deliberative processes, will serve to focus the board on share-
holder gain.
3. "Shareholder Democracy" is Unlikely to Stimulate Shareholder
Participation
Historically, shareholders have been described as passive and apathetic in
proxy voting.2 "9 Economists argue that many shareholders do not vote, or
do not vote against management's position, because it is seldom in their eco-
nomic interests to do so. The outcome of the vote seldom repays the cost of
the time a shareholder must expend to study the various proxy proposals
and cast a well-informed vote.2"° Additionally, a "free-rider" problem exists
in that the shareholder who is willing and able to spend the necessary time
and resources to take a position lacks the incentive to organize others
261
257. It is possible, of course, that "new" board members, in seeking a sense of belonging on
the board, will soon be co-opted by the incumbent majority. Professor George W. Dent, Jr.,
describes this phenomenon in his article Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public
Corporation, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 881, 899.
258. There has been considerable study on the dynamics by which small decisionmaking
groups, comprised of participants with diverse, even competitive, perspectives, can most effec-
tively reach consensus and achieve "decision quality." See, e.g., Smith, Petersen, Johnson &
Johnson, The Effects of Controversy and Concurrence Seeking on Effective Decision Making,
126 J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 237 (1986); Tjosvold & Field, Effect of Concurrence, Controversy,
and Consensus on Group Decision Making, 125 J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 355 (1985); Wall,
Galanes & Love, Small Task-Oriented Groups: Conflict, Conflict Management, Satisfaction,
and Decision Quality, 18 SMALL GROUP BEHAV. 31 (1987).
259. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 44, at 81; Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corpo-
rate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395-97 (1983); Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting, 64
COLUM. L. REV. 1427, 1440-41 (1964).
260. Fischel, supra note 234, at 1277.
261. Id.; see also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 259, at 397; Gordon, Ties that Bond:
Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 44
(1988).
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"[b]ecause no compulsory cost-sharing mechanism exists in these circum-
stances, and because no single shareholder can capture the whole gain to
shareholders generally from the proposal's defeat, there will be insufficient
incentive to organize opposition." '262
These assumptions, however, are proving increasingly unsupportable.
Shareholders today vote in very high numbers, given the stakes usually in-
volved.2 63 They differentiate among the issues presented to them, favoring
some management proposals by wide majorities and others by narrow mar-
gins.264 Moreover, notwithstanding the free-rider problem, shareholders can
and do organize when it is beneficial to them. What else would explain the
rising percentage of votes cast for shareholder proposals in recent years?265
No longer do only religious groups join together in proxy voting cam-
paigns.266 Now other groups of investors, seeking economic as well as social
reforms, organize collective strategies.26 7
Institutional investors in particular are learning to overcome collective
choice and free-rider problems when they believe their actions will suffi-
ciently enhance share value to justify the costs incurred. For example, in
April 1989, CaIPERS and its Pennsylvania counterpart, the Pennsylvania
Public Employees Retirement System, joined together to defeat two anti-
takeover measures submitted by management for shareholder approval at
Honeywell Inc.'s annual meeting. The proposals were routine shark repel-
lents that would have created a classified board with staggered terms and
262. Gordon, supra note 261, at 44; Fischel, supra note 234, at 1277.
263. See Appendix A (a sampling of available information regarding recent shareholder
voting). Many factors may account for the high voter turnout reflected in this sampling from
the 1989 proxy season. Some voting may have been stimulated by the presence of the Depart-
ment of Labor, which had threatened an audit of ERISA fund proxy voting practices. See
infra note 283 and accompanying text. Other factors may have included the presence of eco-
nomically significant shareholder proposals (such as those which would require termination of
poison pills) and the exhortive encouragement of the various proxy voting consulting firms.
See infra notes 280-87 and accompanying text.
264. See Appendix.
265. See O'Hara, Both Shareholders, Management Rack Up Proxy Wins, 7 IRRC CORP.
GOVERNANCE BULL. 90 (July/Aug. 1990) ("At least 20 resolutions at 12 companies have
received majorities of the shares voted, and average shareholder support for almost every type
of proposal is running ahead-in some cases far ahead-of last year's figures.").
266. The Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility, an affiliate of the National Coun-
cil of Churches, has organized proxy campaigns among shareholding churches, religious or-
ders, and others since 1971.
267. An example is the campaign of the United Shareholders Association, announced in
the summer of 1989 and executed during the 1990 proxy season, entitled USA Target 50. This
campaign aimed to secure four reforms at 50 public companies: confidential proxy voting,
elimination of poison pills, shareholder approval of golden parachutes, and exemption from
state antitakeover statutes. 4 USA ADVOCATE No. 8, at 4-5 (Aug. 1989).
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abolished shareholder action by written consent. 26' Though CalPERS and
the Pennsylvania fund together represented less than 5% of Honeywell's
ownership, they organized a campaign among other institutional investors to
defeat these proposals. 269 Their joint efforts took three weeks to execute and
cost approximately $350,000, primarily for the services of a professional
proxy solicitor.210 The organizers of this collective action now estimate that
Honeywell's shareholders benefitted by a rise in share value from $70 per
share when they began to $79 per share, or a total of $388 million in equity
value, when the defeat of the anti-takeover measures was announced three
weeks later.27'
The successful Honeywell initiative was based on the willingness of insti-
tutional shareholders to band together and vote as a group. Underlying any
contemporary discussion of the access issue is the fact that the majority of
shareholders in public companies are no longer mom-and-pop investors with
tiny stakes in a handful of companies. Rather, estimates now indicate that
more than 50% of all shares of public companies are held by well-informed
institutional investors.27 2 Due to the size of their asset base,273 many of
these investors control percentage ownerships in each of several companies
268. HONEYWELL, INC., PROXY, 17-20 (Mar. 23, 1989).
269. Honeywell: The Value of Shareholder Activism, 4 USA ADVOCATE No. 9, at 3 (Sept.
1989) [hereinafter Honeywell].
270. Address by Nell Minow, General Counsel, Institutional Shareholders Services, Inc.,
to United Shareholders Association Annual Meeting (June 26, 1989).
271. Honeywell, supra note 269, at 3. Organizers of the Honeywell initiative also point out
that, following the annual meeting, Honeywell's management restructured the company in
July, 1989 by issuing a substantial dividend, offering to repurchase up to 23% of the com-
pany's stock, and selling its declining weapons systems business and most of its interest in a
Japanese joint venture. By early August 1989, Honeywell's stock was selling at $89 per share.
Id.
272. The breakdown of ownership has been estimated as follows:
Private Pension Funds 15.5%
State and Local Employee Retirement Plans 5.1%
Mutual Funds 5.4%
Life Insurance Companies 2.8%
Foreign 5.6%
Banks, as Trustee 15.3%
Foundations, etc. 4.3%
54.0%
W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS CASES AND MATERIALS 144 (concise 6th ed.
1988).
273. Public and private pension funds alone now control over $2.6 trillion in assets. Light,
The Power of Pension Funds, Bus. WEEK,. Nov. 6, 1989, at 154.
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sufficient to demand management's attention.174 In addition, a majority of
public companies have a concentration of institutional owners2 75 such that
coalitions may be formed and, as in the Honeywell case, joint electoral ef-
forts may be easily undertaken.
As recently as the 1970's, institutional investors were reluctant, even in
the face of constituent pressures, to involve themselves in governance mat-
ters.276 That is no longer the case. Respectable institutions, as well as the
traditional self-promoters, are bringing shareholder proposals to the corpo-
rate ballot 277 and seeking other means of influencing significant management
decisions. 27' These investors are seeking to exercise a "voice" as well as an
"exit" option 2 7 9 as owners of corporate equity.
At least three reasons account for this increased willingness to participate
in governance decisions. First, and particularly with the decline of the junk
bond market, institutional investors increasingly take equity positions,
rather than investing in debt. As they do so, and especially as managed
funds strategically invest in substantial equity blocks rather than more
broadly diversifying their portfolios,2 s° their ability to exit quickly may be
274. For example, CalPERS owns between .7 and 1.0% of nearly 3,000 public companies.
Telephone interview with Kayla J. Gillan, CalPERS Assistant General Counsel (May 17,
1990). The press may assist institutions in their effort to influence corporate policy. When the
state of Michigan announced its intention to vote its General Motors holdings, comprising
approximately 1.5% of the company's common stock, against a proposed executive pension
plan, the story was flagged on the front page of the Wall Street Journal. GM's Plan to Boost
Executive's Pensions Draws Fire: One Big Holder is to Vote 'No,'Wall St. J., May 14, 1990, at
A 1, col. 2, and A4, col. 2.
275. Conard, Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 MICH. J.L. REFORM 117,
133 (1988) (66% of the public companies studied had 200 or fewer institutional owners).
276. Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign GM, 69 MICH.
L. REV. 421, 502-505 (1971) (at several universities, the trustees, in the face of advisory com-
mittee directives to the contrary, voted with management during Campaign GM).
277. See, e.g., Parker, Funds Gird For Proxy Season: 2 Shareholder's Resolutions Make
Their Debut on 1990 Ballots, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT AGE, Nov. 13, 1989, at 92 (describing
(1) TIAA-CREF proposal to require a shareholder vote on any plan to issue a large block of
stock to a single investor; (2) CalPERS and Connecticut Trust Fund's proposal regarding the
counting of abstentions; (3) NYCERS' and CalPERS' proposals urging opt-out from Delaware
anti-takeover statute; (4) CalPERS' and CaISTRS' proposals to create shareholder advisory
committees; and (5) Wisconsin State Investment Board and State of Connecticut Trust Fund's
proposals concerning poison pills).
278. See infra note 319 and accompanying text.
279. The terms derive from A.O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970).
280. See Conard, supra note 275, at 132.
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encumbered. 28 ' As a consequence, the voice option becomes more
compelling.28 2
Second, some institutional investors are now subject to regulatory over-
sight of their voting behavior. In particular, the Department of Labor, in a
widely published advisory letter issued in February 1988, characterized the
right to vote corporate stock as an ERISA "plan asset," thereby subjecting
ERISA trustees and asset managers to liability for voting without due
care.213 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Re-
serve Board also review the exercise of equity voting rights during bank ex-
aminations .2  Regulators are now encouraging institutional investors to
give careful thought to the use of their equity voting power, rather than
simply deferring to managerial objectives or, as has recently occurred, re-
sponding uncritically to short-term market incentives.285 These circum-
stances have resulted in an enhanced sense of stewardship toward share
beneficiaries and responsibility in governance matters.
Third, new practices, such as the proxy voting protocol 2 6 and the availa-
bility of shared cost research,28 7 have reduced the per share cost of informa-
tion gathering and voting. Moreover, as share ownership continues to shift
from individuals to large collective entities, this cost will continue to decline.
Because institutional investors employ professional management and
many must annually account for their voting behavior, 88 they are more
likely than individuals to cast proxy votes, and their votes are more likely to
be well informed. Typically, institutional investors can more effectively eval-
uate the performance of management, and the strength of management nom-
inees, than most individual investors. Moreover, through professional
281. Index funds, which now comprise a substantial percentage of all public and private
pension funds, by definition cannot exit.
282. Cf Schwartz, supra note 276, at 495 ("The 'Wall Street Rule'... may not be wholly
feasible for institutions holding large blocks of stock that cannot be freely sold; such institu-
tions may thus be compelled to take an interest in managerial conduct.").
283. B. KRIKORIAN, FIDUCIARY STANDARDS IN PENSION AND TRUST FUND MANAGE-
MENT 225 (1989).
284. Id. at 243-45.
285. Joint Statement by Departments of Labor and Treasury on Pension Investments, 6
Pens. Plan Guide (CCH) 23,770R (Jan. 31, 1989) (confirming that ERISA does not require
plan managers to automatically tender shares held by the plan to capture any premium repre-
sented by a tender offer).
286. See, e.g., Gilroy & Nelson, The Reactions of Institutional Investors to Shareholder Ini-
tiatives and Management Defensive Proposals, in K. EPPLER & T. GILROY, THE PROXY MA-
CHINERY-SOLICITATIONS AND CONTESTS INVOLVING CORPORATE CONTROL ISSUES 959
apps. C & D (1988) (examples of typical proxy voting protocols).
287. Shared cost research is available through groups such as the Council of Institutional
Investors, IRRC, Analysis Group, Inc., and Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc.
288. See supra text accompanying notes 283-84.
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contacts, they are well situated to assemble, at minimum cost, voting groups
comprised of their peer institutions.
Thus, it is no longer necessarily true that shareholders will not vote, or
will not vote against the status quo. Rather, it is more likely that institu-
tional investors, granted a practical means of nominating and electing their
directoral choices, will exercise that option sparingly and for demonstrable
strategic reasons.28 9
4. An Uninhibited Market for Corporate Control Would More
Efficiently Correct Problems of Poor Board Performance
According to contractarians, investors who purchase common shares in
public companies contract away many of their ownership rights in exchange
for liquidity. This theory assumes that the price paid for shares reflects a
discount for the possibility that incumbent management will shirk their re-
sponsibilities or engage in self-dealing, 290 and also for the fact that by choos-
ing to invest in a public, rather than a closely-held company, investors have
relinquished their right to nominate directoral candidates or to effectively
monitor those elected. If these shareholders later become dissatisfied with
management's performance, they can adequately protect their interests
either by selling their shares or by initiating a shareholders' derivative ac-
tion.29 ' Alternatively, when ineffective management sufficiently devalues a
corporation's shares to render it a target for takeover, dissatisfied sharehold-
ers can turn to the market for corporate control. Eventually, this process
will lead to more competent substitutes replacing the non-performing
managers.2 92
These characterizations of the corporate world invite many responses.
Practical considerations, especially applicable to2 93 institutional investors,
289. A survey of institutional investors conducted in 1990 found that as many as 33% of
them would consider nominating at least one board candidate under certain circumstances. J.
BIERSACH, VOTING BY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES IN
THE 1990 PROXY SEASON 9 (1990).
290. Eg., Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom "Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments
in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 913, 918-19 (1982).
291. Fischel, supra note 234, at 1277 n.63 (because of the liquidity of the capital markets,
the "voice" option is irrelevant to shareholders in public companies); Comment, supra note
235, at 156 (citing Manne, The "Higher Criticism" of the Modern Corporation, 62 COLUM. L.
REV. 399, 410 (1962)).
292. Fischel, supra note 290, at 919.
293. An institutional investor's sale of a block of shares in a single nonperforming company
might result in a substantial price depression. See generally Dent, supra note 257, at 906 (col-
lective abandonment of a security by a number of institutions would further depress the price).
Further, an institutional investor's sale of shares in every company which behaves unaccept-
ably, for example by adopting a poison pill, would leave that investor with no place to go.
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limit the use of the Wall Street Rule29 4 and the courts to redress managerial
misconduct. The market for corporate control is decidedly imperfect, limit-
ing its usefulness as a mechanism of managerial discipline.295 Control trans-
actions only occur where the projected benefits of the transfer substantially
outweigh the transaction costs incurred. Moreover, state anti-takeover stat-
utes, various corporation-specific defensive maneuvers, threatened applica-
tion of antitrust laws, and the decline in funding sources for financing
control purchases have substantially impaired the market's efficiency. More
importantly, the market for corporate control may prove particularly unsat-
isfactory as a mechanism for replacing one or more corporate directors when
a complete transfer of control is neither appropriate nor desirable. Why
should investors be forced to choose between no change and total change in
the composition of a corporate board when a partial change may be enough?
The same theorists who advocate reliance on the market for corporate
control supported managers over shareholders in the 1988 debate over the
dual class recapitalization, or "one share/one vote," issue.296 These theo-
rists argued that shareholders definitionally lack the expertise and access to
information enjoyed by management and, accordingly, cannot easily grasp
complex strategic proposals. Consequently, these theorists claimed that de-
creasing or eliminating the traditional role of shareholders in corporate gov-
ernance could act to economically benefit these shareholders.297
The notion that shareholders would be "better off" without the costly in-
trusions of the voting process and that corporations should consequently re-
deem that portion of their shareholders' equity which represents the suffrage
right is understandably seductive to managers. This is especially true where,
294. See, e.g., Paramount Comms., Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990) (approv-
ing Time Inc.'s defensive acquisition of Warner Communications resulting in a combined share
value of $125, notwithstanding the presence of a responsible bidder willing to pay $200 per
share in cash for unencumbered shares of Time Inc.).
295. Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control. A Critical Assessment of the
Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 121 1-12 (1984); Dent,
supra note 257, at 887-89; Eisenberg, New Modes of Discourse in the Corporate Law Literature,
52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 582, 589-90 (1985); Eisenberg, Shortcomings of the Arguments
Against Modernizing Corporate Law, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 626, 627 (1984); Vagts, Challenges to
Executive Compensation: For the Markets or the Courts?, 8 J. CORP. L. 231, 235-36 (1983).
296. The result of this consideration was the Commission's adoption of Rule 19c-4, 17
C.F.R. § 240.19c-4 (1988), which a court later rejected on the ground that it exceeds the Com-
mission's authority. The Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
297. But see Gordon, supra note 261, at 11-12. Gordon argues that advocates of dual class
recapitalization overlook the influence of managerial opportunism and discount, without sup-
porting evidence, the efficiency of the market in conveying and evaluating information. Id. at
12. Moreover, he contends that the arguments challenging the one share/one vote rule under-
estimate the expertise of many institutional investors to evaluate management's claims and
proposals. Id. at 47.
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as in the case of the prototypical dual class recapitalization, the price offered
for the redemption may be less than the present value of the votes fore-
gone. 298  Economic theorists, however, are less self-interested than execu-
tives in the outcome of the one share/one vote debate and thus more difficult
to defend.
Whatever the validity of the theorists' patronizing arguments, the con-
trary position, advocated by many investors, 299 makes clear that the right to
vote, even when attenuated from the more direct economic benefits of share
ownership and even when control is not in question, is an asset of substantial
value to its owners. The very process of recapitalization confirms the share-
holders' position when issuers offer increased dividends or other economic
incentives in exchange for the forfeiture of the shareholder vote.
Equity investors see the market for corporate control as only one of sev-
eral mechanisms of protection for their economic interests. They rely not
only on a potential takeover bidder, but also on state and federal regulators,
an active business press, aggressive investment analysts, and the collective
response of other shareholders to maximize the value of their shares. None
of these mechanisms provides an exclusive remedy and none is at all times
superior.
5. Transient Investor Coalitions Will Inevitably Select Directors with
Short-term Vision
One critic has suggested that the voting coalitions necessary to achieve the
election of shareholder nominated directoral candidates tend to be short-
lived." Moreover, shareholder nominated directors typically serve only for
298. Quantifying the value of a shareholder vote, however, is difficult. One method com-
pares the price of publicly traded voting shares with otherwise equivalent non-voting shares.
Using this method, researchers have found the presence of voting rights results in an average
premium value of 5.4%. Fischel, supra note 29, at 144-46. Other methods have also been used
to measure the value of the shareholder vote. See Bhagat & Brickley, Cumulative Voting: The
Value of Minority Shareholder Voting Rights, 27 J.L. & ECON. 339, 353-62 (1984) (charter
amendments terminating cumulative voting result in abnormally negative reductions in share
price); Jarrell & Poulsen, Dual-Class Recapitalizations as Antitakeover Mechanisms: The Re-
cent Evidence, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 129, 149 (1988) (noting "significant negative abnormal stock
price returns" averaging 2% immediately following the announcement of a dual class recapi-
talization) (1988); Warren, One Share, One Vote: A Perception of Legitimacy, 14 J. CORP. L.
89, 90 n.6 (1988).
299. See SEC One Share, One Vote Rule a 'Great Victory'for Shareholders, 3 USA ADVO-
CATE No. 8, at 3 (Aug. 1988) (recounting two years of lobbying by the the United Sharehold-
ers Association to persuade the SEC to adopt a one share/one vote rule); letter from CalPERS
to Nancy Smith, reprinted in 134 CONG. REC. S8281 (daily ed. June 21, 1988) (advocating a
statutory one share/one vote guarantee).
300. Reich, Corporate Accountability and Regulatory Reform, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 5
(1979).
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a limited time. This results in decisionmaking "dominated by short-term
immediate concerns at the expense of long-term policies."' '
In politics, memories are often short and passions run high. Exi-
gencies of the moment may overwhelm more sensible, incremental
solutions. Thus legislators, regulatory agency administrators, and
corporate directors and managers may aim for short-term results
that immediately satisfy their constituencies and over which tem-
porary compromises can be negotiated, even though the solutions
may not be as beneficial over the long term.3"2
Evidence exists that members of traditionally selected boards capitulate to
short-term values, 30 3 and commentators in the last two years have increas-
ingly exhorted managers and directors to resist quick fixes and embrace the
long-term view.3 "4 Whether the presence of one or more shareholder nomi-
nated directors on a corporate board would exacerbate existing decisional
patterns is unclear. The assertion that shareholder nominated directors are
likely to reject long-term strategies contradicts Lipton and Lowenstein, who
argue that providing shareholder access to the proxy would encourage long-
term thinking and ultimately serve to retard hostile takeovers.30 5
There are, however, more effective means of curbing hostile takeovers.
More importantly, granting institutional investors direct access to the proxy
is likely to result in a decrease, rather than an increase, in anti-takeover be-
havior such as the approval of poison pills and preemptive business combina-
tions.3 " Nevertheless, the fact that these investors are likely to prefer
market driven corporate policies30 7 over market inhibiting policies30 does
not mean they will necessarily favor "short-term" policies prompting im-
pressive quarterly financial figures over "long-term" policies promoting
steady value gain.
Moreover, no reason exists to assume that a board which includes one or
more members elected following nomination by institutional shareholders,
rather than by the incumbent board, is any more likely as a group to focus on
301. Id. at 26.
302. Id.
303. See, e.g., B. BURROUGHS & J. HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE 4-5 (1990) (not-
ing the preoccupation of CEO Ross Johnson and his board with RJR's "undervalued" stock
price and the need to improve the company's quarterly financial figures).
304. Eg., J. LORSCH, supra note 237, at 188.
305. See supra notes 134-45 and accompanying text.
306. Martin Lipton has said that the new-found interest of institutional investors in corpo-
rate governance is really a disguise for the "movement to promote takeovers." Lenzner,
Shareholders Get Tough-Institutional Funds Flex Their Muscles to Get Some Action, Boston
Globe, May 4, 1989, at 60, col. 4.
307. For example, the imposition of aggressive and unsentimental cost control measures.
308. For example, the adoption of shark repellents.
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short-term concerns. And there can be the additional safeguard of electing
directors for extended terms. That is, one method of discouraging a short-
term mentality, both among management nominated and shareholder nomi-
nated directors, would be to adopt staggered boards with all the members
serving two or three year terms.3 9
6. Empowering Institutional Investors May Ultimately Harm Their
Constituents
Those critical of shareholder access can argue that, by playing a direct
role in nominating directoral candidates, shareholders may subject them-
selves to the coverage of the "controlling persons" provisions of the 1933
and 1934 Acts, 3 1° or to assertions that they are board members and thus
may be liable for short swing trading liabilities under Section 16(b) of the
1934 Act.3 1' These are not arguments against access to the proxy per se but
a caution to those shareholders, especially institutional investors, who might
seek to exercise their access rights.
Institutional investors who nominate directoral candidates may take sev-
eral precautions. First, they should insulate themselves from information
held confidentially by their nominees who are successfully elected.312 Sec-
ond, they should and easily can refrain from the kinds of domineering or
manipulative behaviors which could lead to "controlling person" liability.
313
Third, they should understand that directors-regardless of the source of
309. This approach, however, inhibits takeovers and the efficient operation of the market
for corporate control. Massachusetts recently passed a law mandating staggered boards in
response to the request of Norton Co., which was threatened with a takeover by a British
raider. Foust & Smart, The Merger Parade Runs into a Brick Wall, Bus. WEEK, May 14,
1990, at 38. Staggered boards do not inhibit tender offers for companies which do not have
poison pills. They do inhibit control transfers undertaken by means of a proxy fight.
310. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77o and 78t (1988).
311. Id. § 78p(b); see also Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969)
(Martin Marietta's CEO served on the board of Sperry Rand and was considered "deputized"
to act on Martin Marietta's behalf, effectively rendering Martin Marietta a director, thus ex-
posing it to short-swing liability for corporate trading in Sperry Rand's stock).
312. Lowenstein points out that:
[Ilt ought to be at least as possible for [institutional] investors to develop procedures
like the Chinese Wall of investment bankers so that the information a director re-
ceives at board meetings does not become water fountain gossip back at the mutual
fund offices. [In addition], it would always be available to investors to nominate
business school deans, security analysts, industry specialists, and others who could
represent shareholder interests effectively but whose knowledge would not be im-
puted to the investor.
L. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 139, at 216.
313. Cf Cameron v. Outdoor Resorts of Am., Inc., 608 F.2d 187. 194 (5th Cir. 1979)
(liability based on fact that defendant, the corporation's president, controlled the daily opera-
tions of the business); Bernstein v. Crazy Eddie, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 962, 979 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)
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their nomination-are fiduciaries accountable to all shareholders and not
only to those who were responsible for their initial nomination."" The right
to effectively nominate directoral candidates creates no right to compel
directoral behavior and, prudently exercised, ought not result in liability.
7. Shareholder Nominated Directors Will Bring No Demonstrable
Improvement to Corporate Performance
The conservative observer could argue that there is no compelling need to
impose a new system of directoral selection on public companies at this
time.3" 5 The economy, even if soft, remains productive. There are signs that
as a group, the boards of publicly held corporations are more sensitive to
shareholder concerns than ever before.3" 6 Furthermore, as board composi-
tion shifts to include a larger proportion of "outside" directors, one can ex-
pect boards to act more decisively in the face of crisis and with greater
(plaintiff states claim for controlling person liability where CEO is alleged to have been an
instrumental decisionmaker for the corporation).
314. Cf Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (all directors, regardless of the
source of their nomination, owe the corporation and all its shareholders an "uncompromising
duty of loyalty").
315. Cf Fischel, supra note 234, at 1265-71 (arguing that no evidence exists that the status
quo disadvantages shareholders); New York, Pennsylvania Funds Scrutinize Corporate Boards,
6 IRRC CORP. GOVERNANCE BULL. 143 (Sept./Oct. 1989) (quoting the Chair of the Business
Roundtable asserting that there is "zero correlation" between changes in traditional modes of
corporate governance and improved corporate performance). Professor Lewis Solomon's em-
pirical review in 1978 of the aftermath of several court ordered changes in board composition
concluded that the difference between the "ethos" and performance of the prelitigation and
postlitigation boards was "imperceptible" and that proposals to shift control over directoral
nomination from the CEO to some other entity were unlikely to result in any significant shift
in governance patterns. Solomon, Restructuring the Corporate Board of Directors: Fond
Hope-Faint Promise, 76 MICH. L. REV. 581, 600 (1978). Professor Victor Brudney also
noted the potential shortcomings of relying on "independent" directors as agents of corporate
change. Brudney, supra note 74, at 597. But see Baysinger & Butler, Corporate Governance
and the Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition, I J. L.,
ECON. & ORG. 101, 104 (1985) (finding that "board composition, in terms of the proportion of
outside independent directors, has a mild [positive] effect on organizational performance, but
that the effect is lagged").
316. See generally Taking Charge-Corporate Directors Start to Flex Their Muscle, Bus.
WEEK, July 3, 1989, at 66. "[M]ore and more boards around the country have begun to watch
out for shareholders as never before. In short, they are actually performing as they are, in
theory, supposed to-but seldom have." Id. Many point to the experience of RJR Nabisco,
Inc., as a vivid example of how modern boards can act for the benefit of shareholders when
pressed to do so. Immediately prior to submitting management's proposal for a leveraged
buyout, RJR Nabisco's CEO regularly treated the board of directors to lavish resort accommo-
dations, private jet transportation, profitable consulting contracts and other perquisites such as
participation in nationally televised sporting events. B. BURROUGHS & J. HELYAR, supra note
303, at 165-67. Nevertheless, the board ultimately declined to support management's bid for
the company and sold it to an outside bidding group.
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willingness, even in the absence of crisis, to challenge management ideas and
stimulate greater corporate performance.3 7
Notwithstanding these reassurances, market participants and others con-
tinue to urge reform. Institutional investors exploit crisis situations3" 8 and,
where none exist, seek to create and participate in new advisory bodies
which would assure them some access to otherwise uncommunicative boards
of directors.31 9 While market observers urge alterations in board organiza-
tion,3 2° scholars propose more radical solutions, including the dismantling of
the proxy voting system and the removal of responsibility for directoral se-
lection from incumbent managers and incumbent boards. 2 ' There is a
growing sense that the existing system of directoral selection fails to meet the
market's needs. While that may not be a sufficient reason to embrace an idea
repeatedly rejected for nearly 50 years, it does suggest that access to the
proxy merits renewed consideration. This is especially true in light of cur-
rent efforts to make the capital markets of the European Communities more
attractive to international investors.3 22 If significant investors value access
to the proxy and cannot acquire it in the course of domestic securities
purchases, they may look elsewhere.
B. The Affirmative Case
As previously examined, several reasons exist for granting significant
shareholders the right to nominate directoral candidates: it will energize
board decisionmaking practices; bring balance to any movement toward
management entrenchment; and provide fiduciary institutions the opportu-
nity to bring special expertise to the aid of poorly performing companies.
Another potential benefit of shareholder access to the proxy is that it
would provide a mechanism by which an attentive shareholder could initiate
action in a cost effective manner, thus preventing harm to the corporation
317. See Weisbach, Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 431 (1988)
(suggesting firms with outsider dominated boards are more likely to replace the CEO in the
face of poor stock performance, and to do so more quickly, than firms with insider dominated
boards, thus resulting in increased share value).
318. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
319. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
320. E.g., Knowlton & Millstein, Can the Board of Directors Help the American Corpora-
tion Earn the Immortality It Holds So Dear?, in J.R. MEYER & J.M. GUSTAFSON, THE U.S.
BUSINESS CORPORATION-AN INSTITUTION IN TRANSITION 184 (1988) (recommending that
one of the outside directors, rather than the CEO, routinely serve as chairman of the board);
Lipton, An End to Hostile Takeovers and Short-Termism, THE FIN. TIMES, June 27, 1990, at
21 (recommending quinquennial board elections).
321. See infra notes 362-77 and accompanying text.
322. See, e.g., Europe Shows Leadership on Shareholder Rights, 5 USA ADVOCATE No. 8,
at 5 (Aug. 1990).
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before it occurs. The harm averted may include friction between capital
providers and capital expenders. It may also include less than optimal
modes of directoral decisionmaking, inattention to constituency demands,
and simple self-dealing. Effective prophylactic action, however, will likely
occur only if there exists a means of distributing the costs among the
beneficiaries.
Currently, shareholders are entitled to share the cost with other share-
holders of self-initiated behavior in only three settings: (1) a shareholder
derivative suit, where their costs may be reimbursed and their attorneys' fees
effectively spread among all shareholders if they prevail;323 (2) a proxy con-
test where their costs may be reimbursed only if they succeed in effecting a
transfer of control and a shareholder vote authorizes reimbursement; 324 and
(3) circulating policy proposals to other shareholders, where they may share
the cost if those proposals are among the limited categories authorized by
the SEC's shareholder proposal rule.325
In the first situation, the derivative suit, the ability to spread the cost of
reform depends on a finding that the corporation experienced some harm,
that the litigating shareholder detected and corrected the harm, and that the
corporation benefitted from the correction.? 6 In the second situation, the
proxy contest, again the corporation must have experienced harm sufficient
to generate a perceived need for change in control. Given their expense,
proxy contests are undertaken only in extreme circumstances. In the third
situation, the shareholder proposal, harm to the corporation need not be
apparent before the proposal is advanced. Regulatory limitations on the use
of shareholder proposals, however, result in many important issues never
323. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
324. Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291
(1955).
325. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
326. See, e.g., Mills, 396 U.S. at 389-97 (corporate benefit found in plaintiff's proof of inad-
equate shareholder communication); Reiser v. Del Monte Properties Co., 605 F.2d 1135 (9th
Cir. 1979) (same); Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 555 (7th Cir. 1975)
(same); Ramey v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., 508 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1974) (corporate benefit
found in plaintiff's delay of a risky repurchase plan permitting renegotiation); Denney v. Phil-
lips & Buttorf" Corp., 331 F.2d 249 (6th Cir. 1964) (corporate benefit found in rescission of a
corporate purchase of shares at an inflated price); Milstein v. Werner, 58 F.R.D. 544
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (corporate benefit found in modification of an employee stock purchase plan
requiring employees to pay a higher price for their shares); Tanzer v. Huffines, 345 F. Supp.
279 (D. Del. 1972) (corporate benefit found in the removal of management accused of misap-
propriating corporate assets); Berger v. Amana Soc'y, 135 N.W.2d 618 (Iowa 1965) (corporate
benefit found in the nullification of a charter amendment).
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reaching the corporate ballot.327 In addition, shareholder proposals are non-
binding.328 One might argue that this arrangement encourages litigation or
outright proxy fights as the only meaningful mechanisms of shareholder ex-
pression, rather than encouraging such expression at a prophylactic stage,
and that it prohibits timely and preventive shareholder expression with re-
spect to many economically important issues. Shareholder access to the
proxy provides an alternative and constructive means of addressing potential
harm before it occurs.
There is one final reason supporting shareholder access to the proxy for
purposes of directoral nomination. Studies have shown that competition for
board positions stimulates an increase in share value.329 Though these stud-
ies focused on the traditional proxy contest with independent solicitations
and a separate proxy ballot for the insurgents, competition for board posi-
tions which occurs in other forms, such as through the use of a common
ballot, may have similar, albeit less dramatic, results. Competition invites
the market's attention and, more often than not, its respect.
C. Logistical Issues Presented by Shareholder Access Proposals
Several logistical issues require consideration in connection with share-
holder access to the proxy proposals. These issues are best characterized by
the following questions: (1) who should have standing as a nominator under
an access to the proxy rule; (2) if standing is based upon some minimum
level of share ownership, is the preferential treatment thereby created imper-
missible; (3) should shareholders be permitted to aggregate their shares to
satisfy the ownership requirement; (4) if shareholders are permitted to aggre-
gate their shares to satisfy the ownership requirement, should the existing
restrictions on "solicitation" govern the process of assembling the nominat-
ing group; (5) what restriction, if any, should be placed on the number of
nominees which can be put forward by a nominating group; (6) if an entitled
327. In particular, executive compensation, employee relations, and environmental policies
all fall within the "ordinary business operations" exclusion to the shareholder proposal rule.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(7) (1990).
328. See Valente & Rose, Santa Fe Southern Faces Thorny Issue of Whether to Accept Vote
on Poison Pill, Wall St. J., May 26, 1988, at 14, col. I (shareholder proposal to rescind a poison
pill passed with majority support; board considered whether to follow shareholder wishes or
ignore them).
329. Cf. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 259, at 395. "[V]oting contests produce price
increases-presumably reflecting real increases in the value of the firm-whether or not they
lead to changes in control. The price increase takes place when the market learns of the con-
test, and it persists even if the insurgents are defeated." Id. at 407 (footnote omitted); see also
Dodd & Warner, On Corporate Governance: A Study of Proxy Contests, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 401,
435 (1983) ("[tlhe positive share price performance holds for contests where the dissidents fail
to capture majority control of the board as well as those where the incumbents are ousted.").
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shareholder nominates one or more directoral candidates, is the shareholder
subject to rule 14a- 11 governing election contests; and (7) assuming a share-
holder is granted access to the proxy for purposes of making a nomination,
does that right include the right to promote the candidate and "electioneer"
on the face of the proxy statement or elsewhere?
1. Standing
Many would argue that the mere ownership of stock on a given record
date should not afford a shareholder access to the corporate proxy state-
ment, or even the right to vote, when the shareholder may have purchased
the stock days, or hours, before and may resell the stock days, or hours,
later. a° Arbitrageurs, for example, or program traders would be poor can-
didates for status as nominators.
One might argue that, unlike long-term oriented fundamental stock pick-
ers, these traders would have no interest in nominating directoral candidates
because the costs of finding and enlisting them would outweigh any short-
term gain resulting from their election. Therefore, there is no need to con-
sider them in crafting an access to the proxy regulation. Concerns about
transient influence on corporate governance, however, are legitimate. There
is some value in limiting a meaningful role in corporate decisionmaking to
those with some institutional memory.33" ' The SEC's shareholder proposal
rule recognizes that even an insignificant role in corporate governance ought
to require some proof of durational share ownership. 32 A comparable dura-
tional ownership requirement for shareholders seeking access to the proxy
for purposes of directoral nomination not only would bring symmetry to
shareholder initiated governance measures, but also would create an addi-
tional incentive for long-term holding. Any workable access proposal, like
the rule 14a-8 shareholder proposal rule, should include a requirement that
any nominator demonstrate a minimum durational ownership of one year
and continuous ownership through the date of the annual meeting.
330. 'A CEO of a major corporation was heard to ask, in the course of a tirade against
'raiders,' 'Can you apply the word "Owner" to a 26-year old pension-fund trader sitting at his
CRT screen and trying to out-perform the woman down the hall?'" Conard, supra note 275,
at 167.
331. Cf L. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 139, at 194 ("[l]t is silly to pretend that in-and-out
investors have much to contribute to the market or to the companies whose shares they so
briefly hold.").
332. Cf 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a)(1) (1990) (a proponent of a shareholder proposal must
hold the securities for at least one year and shall continue to own such securities through the
date on which the meeting is held).
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2 The Share Ownership Threshold
A minimum ownership requirement of $1000 or 1% of market value,
whichever is less, 33 3 like the durational ownership requirement discussed
above, would create symmetry in matters of ballot access. An ownership
requirement this low, however, would freely grant access to the ballot to
many shareholders with miniscule holdings, thus trivializing the nominating
process. This was one of the recurring concerns about earlier access propos-
als, which later proposals such as Lipton's and Lowenstein's and the recent
congressional bills have attempted to address. A workable access rule
should set the threshold ownership requirement much higher than is appro-
priate for shareholder proposals, in the range of $1 million to $5 million or 3
to 5% of the outstanding voting shares, whichever is less.334
Any access proposal containing a minimum ownership requirement re-
sults in treating some shareholders preferentially to other holders of the
same class of shares. The SEC does not permit management to favor certain
shareholders over others of the same class in the context of corporate self-
tender offers. 3  How can it permit such favoritism in the context of an
election for the board of directors? While this treatment may seem unfair, it
is not unlawful. States have recognized that shareholders with large hold-
ings may be treated differently, generally more harshly, than shareholders
with smaller holdings. 3 6 The SEC has also approved preferential treatment
for shareholders based upon their holdings in the context of rule 14a-8.337
3. Aggregation
The shareholder proposal rule does not permit aggregation of shares to
meet the $1,000 or 1% of market value ownership requirement. Rather, rule
14a-8 requires the proponent to be the beneficial owner of the required
number of securities. The same rule could apply to access to the proxy for
purposes of directoral nomination, but it should not. Prohibiting aggrega-
tion by shareholders would effectively limit access to a very small universe of
investors whose views may already carry substantial weight with incumbent
333. The $1000 or 1% of market value is the minimum ownership required of shareholders
wishing to bring shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8. See supra note 14 and accompany-
ing text.
334. Note that some high capitalization companies have thousands of shareholders with
holdings in excess of $500,000, which would render proposals with ownership thresholds be-
low that figure unworkable.
335. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(f)(8) (1990) (the "all-holders" rule).
336. See Buxbaum, The Internal Division of Powers in Corporate Governance, 73 CALIF. L.
REV. 1671, 1693-94 (1985) (recounting case and statutory law which imposes special restric-
tions on large holders).
337. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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management. Permitting aggregation, while technically more complicated,
is the better choice; it would broaden the availability of access to effective
coalition builders.
4. The "Solicitation" Problem
Section 14(a) prohibits the solicitation of proxies unless that solicitation
complies with the SEC proxy rules.338 These rules describe the required
form of proxy339 and the information which must accompany or precede
it.34' The SEC defines solicitation to include "any request for a proxy.",34 ,
Courts construe this definition broadly, including within its ambit fundrais-
ing letters mailed in anticipation of future collective shareholder action,342
newspaper advertisements critical of management, 343 and statements made
to the financial press advocating the breakup of a public company. 3" Some
courts have held "solicitation" to include the dissemination to shareholders
of any writings, whether or not they strictly solicit a proxy, which are "part
of 'a continuous plan' intended to end in solicitation. " 3 5 This suggests that
contacts between shareholders with the short-term objective of pooling their
shares to satisfy the ownership threshold necessary to nominate a directoral
candidate, but with the long-term objective of encouraging the casting of
proxy ballots for that candidate, may, under existing law, constitute unlaw-
ful "solicitation." These restrictions only apply when the shareholder con-
tacts more than ten other shareholders.346 Therefore, if eleven or more
shareholders are required to satisfy a share ownership requirement for plac-
ing a directoral nomination on the ballot, the mere act of putting together a
nominating group could result in liability under the securities laws. A work-
able access rule will require an amendment to rule 14a- 1 to exclude from the
definition of solicitation the mere formation of a nominating group.
338. 15 U.S.C. § 78(n) (1988).
339. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(a)(l)-(3) (1990).
340. Id. § 240.14a-5.
341. Id. § 240.14a-1(/)(I)(i).
342. Canadian Javelin Ltd. v. Brooks, 462 F. Supp. 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re First Home
Inv. Corp. of Kan., Inc., 368 F. Supp. 597 (D. Kan. 1973).
343. Long Island Lighting Co. v. Barbash, 779 F.2d 793 (2nd Cir. 1985).
344. Trans World Corp. v. Odyssey Partners, 561 F. Supp. 1315, 1320 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
345. Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1966); see also SEC v. Okin,
132 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir. 1943). Communications among a shareholder group which under-
stands from the outset that each member is opposed to the proposed corporate action do not
constitute a "solicitation." Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44, 73 (D. N.J. 1974).
Likewise, communications with the purpose of encouraging shareholders to lobby manage-
ment where no proxy submission is anticipated do not rise to the level of "solitication." Chris-
Craft Indus., Inc. v. Independent Stockholders Comm., 354 F. Supp. 895 (D. Del. 1973).
346. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(l) (1990).
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5. Capping the Number of Nominees Which Any Nominating Group
May Propose
Many would argue that raiders and others seeking a complete turnover in
the control of the board should be excluded from utilizing an access to the
proxy regulation. Instead, they should be compelled to use separate solicita-
tion documents to maintain the integrity of the corporate proxy and mini-
mize shareholder confusion. While raiders are unlikely to seek access under
the rules proposed in this Article,347 it is reasonable that they should be
prohibited from doing so. As a mechanism for differentiating between long-
term investors seeking to contribute to the existing board and those seeking
to seize control of the board, there should be a cap on the number of
directoral candidates which a nominator or nominating group may advance
in a single proxy. A limit of three nominees is reasonable. Admittedly, the
cap will not always effectively exclude nominators who are seeking a change
in control,34 but it is an evenhanded way of limiting misuse of the access
privilege.
6. Application of the "Election Contest" Rule
Traditionally, when management proposes a slate of directoral candidates
and shareholders advance a counter slate, the insurgents prepare their own
proxy solicitation and a separate proxy ballot. Rule 14a-11 governs this
form of "election contest 349 and requires that prior to undertaking a proxy
solicitation, the insurgent group must first clear with the Commission any
solicition material intended for shareholder distribution. 350 Furthermore,
the group must supply on Schedule 14B personal and financial information
concerning their nominees. 35 '
Nothing in rule 14a- 11 requires an insurgent group to solicit by means of
an independent proxy solicitation and separate proxy ballot. Presumably,
insurgents could merely attend the annual meeting, make a nomination from
the floor, and seek votes from the few shareholders present. Alternatively,
they could limit their proxy solicitation to no more than ten other sharehold-
ers, in which case-absent fraud-they would not subject themselves to the
347. See infra text following note 353.
348. Occasionally, a significant change in control can be effectuated by the election of three
or fewer directoral candidates. For example, in 1990, Centaur Partners Group led a proxy
contest for three board seats at National Intergroup, Inc., and won, leading to the decision-
opposed by the previous board-to liquidate the company. Kramer, National Intergroup to
Take Bids for Firm, INVESTOR'S DAILY, Aug. 23, 1990, at 21. Centaur's proxy contest cost it
$4.2 million in solicitation expenses. Id.
349. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11 (1990).
350. Id. § 240.14a-II(e).
351. Id. § 240.14a-11(c).
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oversight of the SEC.15 2 Because premeeting solicitation of many sharehold-
ers is necessary to secure an adequate vote, persons engaged in a contest for
control subject themselves to the demands of the costly preclearance proce-
dures. Shareholder access to the proxy would provide an alternative to the
election contest rule.
The "common ballot" option proposed in this Article would be exclusive.
That is, a nominator choosing to place a nominee on the corporate ballot
would be foreclosed from later circulating a separate ballot. He would also
be foreclosed from distributing written solicitation materials separate from
the corporate proxy statement.
Selecting the common ballot option would subject the nominator to at
least one substantial disability. Votes cast by shareholders would be re-
turned to management's agent, rather than to the nominator. Advocates of
confidential proxy voting argue that when managers receive proxy cards,
they commonly resolicit those shareholders who voted against manage-
ment's recommendations. 3  By contrast, those who oppose management's
view cannot resolicit because they, unlike management, are unable to ascer-
tain who has rejected their proposals.
Because of the importance of monitoring incoming ballots, thus permit-
ting resolicitation of targeted shareholders, investors pursuing a change in
control will always select the separate ballot option under rule 14a- 11.
Others, such as institutional investors seeking to alter the composition of the
board by one or two members, might well select the common ballot option to
reduce their solicitation costs. Regardless of which option they chose, nomi-
nators and their candidates would bear the responsibility for compliance
with disclosure and antifraud rules. 354 Either option would require nomi-
nees to file with the SEC the information now required on Schedule 14B.
7. Electioneering
Permitting a shareholder to include a biographical description of a
directoral nominee in a company's proxy material is quite different from per-
mitting that shareholder to explain the rationale for presenting the nominee
to other shareholders and for preferring that nominee over one or more of
the board-nominated candidates. Such explanations presumably would in-
volve criticism of the existing board.
352. See supra note 346 and accompanying text.
353. See letter from CaIPERS to Nancy Smith (Sept. 30, 1987) (noting management prac-
tice of resolicitation), reprinted in 134 CONG. REC. S8281 (1988).
354. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1990).
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The existing shareholder proposal rule permits proponents to include,
alongside the text of their proposal, a supporting statement 3 which, within
reason, may incorporate personal invective and opinion. The SEC, however,
prohibits proponents from attacking management personally, for example,
by seeking removal of individual directors356 or by advancing a proposal
"counter to a proposal to be submitted by the [management] at the meet-
ing. ''35 7 Apparently, the theory is that official corporate documents should
be decorous and speak with one voice. Statements impugning the quality of
incumbent management, or challenging their strategic vision, only confuse
shareholders and ought to appear elsewhere.
This theory not only underestimates those shareholders who choose to
vote, it also penalizes substantial shareholders seeking to communicate with
others concerning the need to improve the board. The SEC should permit
advocacy in support of directoral nominations to appear on corporate proxy
statements to the same extent they now permit advocacy for shareholder
proposals. This would-serve the dual goals of providing full disclosure to
investors and a more enlightened forum for the exchange of ideas among
shareholders. Specifically, the SEC should permit shareholder nominators
to make the case in support of their nominees, and against one or more of
the incumbent candidates, on the face of the proxy statement-subject to
existing limitations on hyperbole3 58 and defamation. Management, of
course, should be permitted to respond in kind.
VI. A PROPOSAL FOR A LIMITED ACCESS TO THE PROXY REGULATION
The SEC should adopt, as part of an overall review of the federal proxy
rules or otherwise, a regulation substantially similar to that proposed in The
Corporate Takeover Reform Act of 1989 .3 9 This regulation would permit a
shareholder or shareholder group owning $1 million or 3% of the market
value, whichever is less, of a public company's voting stock to nominate up
to three directoral candidates. In addition, the candidates' credentials would
appear on the corporate proxy statement, and their names on the official
355. Id. § 240.14a-8(b)(l).
356. General Pub. Util., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 10, 1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec library,
Noact file) (proposal recommending removal of four officers excluded from the ballot).
357. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(9) (1990).
358. See, e.g., Westland Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Sept. 10, 1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec
library, Noact file) (requiring proponent to label opinions as such and to delete unsupported
statements such as: "nominations to the Board of Directors of the Company have been con-
trolled by existing directors," "shareholders of the Company have expressed a strong willing-
ness to nominate and elect new representatives to the Board," and "existing directors have
controlled the election process").
359. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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corporate ballot. Owners whose shares are counted in the nominating group
must have owned their shares at least one year prior to the scheduled annual
meeting.
Access to the proxy is preferable to alternative proposals, particularly to
the shareholder advisory committee proposals advanced by some sharehold-
ers during the 1990 proxy season.3 "° It is similarly preferable to the propo-
sal recently advanced by Professor George V. Dent, Jr., advocating a shift in
control over proxy solicitation from incumbent management to a committee
comprised of a corporation's largest shareholders.36'
A. The Shareholders' Advisory Committee
Creating a shareholders' advisory committee will only add an unneeded
layer to the process of corporate governance, which is already characterized
by a proliferation of special committees, advisory committees, and other task
groups which tend to diffuse responsibility for decisionmaking. In addition,
it is difficult to tell how many shareholders will find it worth the cost to
participate in meetings designed to convey advice and counsel to a body, the
board of directors, which is free to disregard it, and over which they have no
enforcement powers. Conversely, it is also hard to tell how much credence
the board is likely to give the recommendations of an advisory body when
the advisors, unlike the decisionmakers, run no risk of personal liability and
little risk of public opprobrium. The advisory committee proposals may ap-
peal to their sponsors as a way of insulating institutional investors from real
responsibility, while guaranteeing that they will receive some increased at-
tention from management. They are unlikely, however, to improve corpo-
rate performance.
B. Professor Dent's Proposal
Professor Dent advocates a system in which the ten to twenty largest
shareholders of a public company would assume control over the nomina-
tion of all directoral candidates and the administration of the proxy voting
system. Dent argues that institutional investors willingly will assume many
of the costs of such a system362 and that his proposal is preferable to access
to the proxy. Dent asserts that the strength of his proposal lies in its avoid-
360. See, e.g., CalPERS proposal to shareholders of Avon Products, Inc., supra note 91
and accompanying text.
361. Dent, supra note 257, at 907.
362. Id. at 908.
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ance of "open opposition" to incumbent management and in the "punish-
ment" of active shareholders which might follow.
363
Dent's proposal, while provocative, is flawed. Many institutional inves-
tors want nothing to do with directoral selection.3 As for those that might,
consider an investor such as CalPERS. As a largely indexed fund with hold-
ings between .7 and 1.0% of the shares of approximately 3000 public compa-
nies, CalPERS is probably among the largest ten to twenty shareholders of
several hundred companies.161 It is unrealistic to assume that a publicly
funded pension system, whose primary fiduciary obligation is to its benefi-
ciaries, would assume the task of actively managing the directoral selection
processes of all these companies, regardless of the quality of their incumbent
managements.366 If given the power, CalPERS or other large investors are
far more likely to target selectively specific corporations in which they be-
lieve a more balanced board would lead to improved performance.
367
Furthermore, consider the other investors who are likely to be among the
ten to twenty largest shareholders of a public company. Statistics suggest
that some members of the board, including the CEO, management con-
trolled pension funds, and employee stock ownership plans, often fall within
this group.368 What is the point of overhauling the entire system of
directoral selection, when many of the same players whose roles Dent criti-
cizes will simply reappear as influential members of the new nominating
body?
Dent favors the wholesale turnover of the directoral selection process
from incumbent management to institutional investors, arguing that this
would generate less contention than amending the existing system to provide
limited shareholder access to the proxy.369 Shifting responsibility for the
nomination of directors away from management and into the hands of large
investors might eliminate the managerial pressure tactics which often ac-
363. Id. at 908-09.
364. See Hollie, Activism Not Rolefor Firms, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT AGE, Oct. 2, 1989,
at 17 (mutual fund managers "do not support the kind of activism that seeks to make changes
in the boards," and accordingly do not seek, or want, a role in corporate governance).
365. Telephone interview with Kayla J. Gillan, CalPERS Assistant General Counsel (May
17, 1990).
366. The prospect of assuming such responsibilities might inhibit investors from acquiring
substantial blocks of shares.
367. CaIPERS is governed by a Policy Statement which limits the fund's involvement in
governance matters to those companies which are poor performers. Telephone interview with
Kayla J. Gillan, CalPERS Assistant General Counsel (May 17, 1990).
368. Jensen & Warner, The Distribution of Power Among Corporate Managers, Sharehold-
ers and Directors, 20 J. FIN. EcON. 3, 6, table 1 (1988).
369. Dent, supra note 257, at 908.
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company a contested proxy issue.370 The risk of abuse in a competitive vot-
ing system, however, is quite small. Though corporate managers possess
some leverage over service providers and their own ESOP's and in-house
pension funds,37 ' they possess no leverage over consumer marketed mutual
funds or public pension funds and are unlikely to influence their votes. Man-
agers' alleged influence over the ESOP's and pension funds of other compa-
nies372 is also overstated. To the extent that undue managerial influence on
proxy voting exists, regulators should prohibit such conduct or require its
disclosure rather than dismantle, as Dent suggests, the entire proxy voting
system.
Dent finally argues that any system in which someone other than incum-
bent management nominates less than a majority of the board inevitably re-
sults in the co-optation of the minority.373 He recounts the dismal history of
outside directors acquiescing to the wishes of management in such matters
as executive compensation and anti-takeover strategies.37 4 Recent evidence
suggests Dent's cynicism about director independence may be misplaced, or
at least that directoral acquiescence may be receding. Even hand picked
boards sometimes demonstrate an ability to remain independent when con-
fronted with gross conflicts of interest or the need to remove a friend from
office. 3 75 In any event, Dent's assumption that a minority bloc of share-
holder-elected directors "would [in no event] be very effective" 3 76 discounts
modem learning about group dynamics and the abilities of a persuasive and
persistent minority to effect change.
3 77
370. See J. HEARD & H. SHERMAN, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE PROXY VOTING
SYSTEM 44-45, 50-52 (1987) (recounting numerous incidents in which management attempted
to direct the voting practices of banks, insurance companies, and fund managers with whom
they did business).
371. The latter funds may allocate no more than 10% of their assets to the sponsoring
company's shares. 29 U.S.C. § 1 107(a)(2) (1982).
372. See J. HEARD & H. SHERMAN, supra note 370, at 53; L. LOWENSTEIN, supra note
139, at 208 (describing letters between CEO's urging each other to influence or direct the vote
of their pension fund managers).
373. Dent, supra note 257, at 909.
374. Id. at 900.
375. See supra notes 316-17 and accompanying text.
376. Dent, supra note 257, at 909.
377. See, e.g., Moscovici, Social Influence and Conformity, in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 347 (G. Lindzey & E. Aronson 3d ed. 1984) (group participants representing a
minority viewpoint can be effective persuaders if they demonstrate commitment, an acceptable
"'behavioral style," consistency but not rigidity, and rely on current and "novel" information);
Wall, Galanes & Love, supra note 258, at 32 ("[C]onflict that expands the options available to
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V. CONCLUSION
Twelve years ago, at the height of the shareholder democracy movement,
the Supreme Court, in a decision striking down a state statute prohibiting
certain forms of political lobbying by corporations, embraced the notion that
"shareholder democracy" is real. 378 The Court found no rational justifica-
tion for enacting legislation with the stated intent of protecting minority
shareholders from the expenditure of corporate funds in the pursuit of public
policy choices personally offensive to them:
Ultimately shareholders may decide, through the procedures of
corporate democracy, whether their corporation should engage in
debate on public issues. Acting through their power to elect the
board of directors or to insist upon protective provisions in the cor-
poration's charter, shareholders normally are presumed competent
to protect their own interests. a79
The Delaware Supreme Court also gives substantial lip service to share-
holder democracy in the context of directoral election, if not in the context
of other contests for control.38°
As practiced today, the "power to elect the board of directors" is an illu-
sory one, just as the power of black voters to meaningfully participate in the
election of state and local officials in the absence of a genuine role in the
nomination process was held illusory in the historic "White Primary"
cases. 381 In the case of public suffrage, the Constitution ensures that voters
will have an effective voice in the selection of their representatives,382 includ-
a group and increases the motivational and involvement level of the members will enhance the
quality of outcome.").
One additional alternative to the access proposal is to leave well enough alone. I do not
address that option here, but merely reiterate Lowenstein's point that access is an experiment
worth trying. L. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 139, at 217-18.
378. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
379. Id. at 794-95 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
380. E.g., Saxon Indus., Inc v. NKFW Partners, 488 A.2d 1298 (Del. 1985) (shareholders
may compel convening of shareholders meeting to replace directors, notwithstanding pen-
dency of Chapter 11 proceedings, given "the strong Delaware policy behind the free exercise of
a stockholder's right to elect directors"); see also Stroud v. Grace, No. 10719 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1,
1990) (LEXIS, States library, DEL file) (bylaws circumscribing the right of shareholders to
nominate directoral candidates held unlawful).
381. E.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (state may not facilitate system in which
black voters are excluded from straw vote conducted by local political organization, the
"Jaybird Democratic Club," where, as a practical matter, only the candidate who won this
straw vote would seek nomination in the "official" Democratic primary); Smith v. Allwright,
321 U.S. 649 (1944) (state cannot exclude a voter from a party primary on the basis of race,
where the primary is the sole means for certifying nominees for inclusion on the general elec-
tion ballot).
382. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 580 (1964).
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ing an opportunity to participate in the selection of those candidates whose
names will appear on the general election ballot.383 No comparable protec-
tion exists for American shareholders. At best, they have been relegated to a
ceremonial role in the governance of corporations. 3"
Recent court decisions have held that, with rare exceptions, corporate
governance is the exclusive domain of the board of directors.3 5 That being
the case, the SEC should afford shareholders a practical means of challeng-
ing the makeup of the board, as it has afforded them a practical means of
challenging or criticizing the board's policy decisions under Rule 14a-8,
without requiring shareholders to undertake a costly all-out proxy fight.
The SEC should adopt a limited access to the proxy rule for a limited
category of shareholders. The object of this proposal is quite modest-to
permit shareholders of demonstrated strength and fidelity to a public com-
pany to express directly and communicate a directoral preference to other
shareholders. If shareholders' suffrage rights are to mean anything, this op-
tion should be made available for their use.
383. The Court has recognized the primary election as an "integral part of the entire elec-
tion process." Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 735 (1974); see also Durkin v. Nat'l Bank of
Olyphant, 772 F.2d 55, 59 (1985), which held that the statutory right to vote for bank direc-
tors includes the right to nominate directoral candidates:
We rest our holding.., on the common sense notion that the unadorned right to cast
a ballot in a contest for office, a vehicle for participatory decisionmaking and the
exercise of choice, is meaningless without the right to participate in selecting the
contestants. As the nominating process circumscribes the range of the choice to be
made, it is a fundamental and outcome-determinative step in the election of office-
holders. To allow for voting while maintaining a closed candidate selection process
thus renders the former an empty exercise. This is as true in the corporate suffrage
context as it is in civic elections ....
Id
384. Buxbaum, supra note 336, at 1683.
385. Eg., Paramount Comms., Inc. v. Time Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,514, at 93,284 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), affrd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990). "The
corporation law does not operate on the theory that directors... are obligated to follow the
wishes of a majority of shares. In fact, directors, not shareholders, are charged with the duty
to manage the firm." Md
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APPENDIX
VOTER RESULTS ON MANAGEMENT AND SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS,
SEPTEMBER 1, 1988 - AUGUST 31, 19891
Votes
Voter
Company For Against Abstain Turnout
2
A.G. Edwards 59.7 14.8 7.9 82.4
59.4 15.1 7.9 82.4
A.H. Belo 83.3 1.9 5.0 90.2
AGS Computers 76.9 .4 .1 77.4
Acuson 69.0 2.2 8.6 79.8
61.1 9.6 9.1 79.8
Adams Express 71.0 6.3 2.9 80.2
Advanced Micro Dev. 69.1 11.9 5.0 86.0
Advest Group 64.3 8.3 .5 73.1
62.7 9.6 .7 73.0
62.7 9.8 .6 73.1
Affiliated Pub. 80.7 2.9 .1 83.7
74.1 2.1 .1 76.3
Airborne Freight 62.2 16.7 12.0 90.0
Alexander & Baldwin 85.1 5.1 2.0 92.2
83.6 6.3 2.1 92.0
Alltel 79.6 .9 .7 81.2
Amdahl 69.9 2.4 .5 72.8
America West A/L 59.4 6.4 19.1 80.4
American Capital 94.4 2.2 .2 96.8
American Cyanamid 70.5 3.4 1.1 75.0
Ameritech 67.9 11.5 2.0 80.4
Amgen 72.8 7.4 .3 80.5
Anacomp 50.2 i6.8 15.7 82.7
53.1 16.7 12.9 82.7
Anthem Electronics 76.3 7.0 .2 83.5
52.2 17.5 13.7 83.4
1. Data taken from L. KRASNOW, VOTING BY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES IN THE 1989 PROXY SEASON 55-60 (1989).
2. Voter turnout is calculated by the formula (# of votes cast / # eligible to vote) x 100.
Shortridge, Estimating Voter Participation, in ANALYZING ELECTORAL HISTORY 137 (J.
Clubb, W. Flanigan & N. Zingale eds. 1981).
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53.2 16.5 13.7 83.4
Apache 66.4 5.0 1.8 73.2
Apple Bank 61.2 13.3 .5 75.0
Apple Computer 58.6 10.1 .4 69.1
Applied Biosystems 67.0 9.1 10.0 86.1
73.6 7.0 3.4 84.0
72.1 5.7 5.7 83.5
Arkla 80.6 3.3 1.1 85.0
74.6 5.6 1.1 81.3
Augat 67.1 10.0 .3 77.4
Aventek 82.4 2.2 1.3 85.9
72.3 4.4 1.2 77.9
Avnet 70.6 9.8 1.3 81.7

